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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation contributes to the study of the Chinese economy by elaborating China’s 
alternative economic system, examining the evolution of Chinese environmental policies, and 
proposing a Chinese Green Job Guarantee. Delineating China’s political economy post-1949, I 
challenge the Eurocentric interpretation of China’s post-1978 economic reform as an incomplete 
and ongoing transition and argue that the Chinese economy, instead of transitioning, has 
transformed into a distinct type of market economy. To understand the Chinese economy, the 
question to ask is not whether China today is capitalist or socialist, or whether the Chinese 
government is interfering too much with the market, but rather what kind of a market economy 
could best fulfill the developmental vision set by the Chinese state. Echoing this finding, I illustrate 
that the Chinese environmental policies have evolved from contradiction to synthesis since 2005, 
and hence the Chinese state has been and likely will be shaping China’s environmental landscape 
more responsibly and effectively into the future. Finally, I demonstrate that the Chinese state 
should and can implement a Green Job Guarantee program to coordinate economic growth, full 
employment, structural adjustments, and environmental sustainability. In 2019, increasing China’s 
fiscal deficit by 1.58% of GDP would have financed a complete Job Guarantee to eliminate 
China’s 24.27 million urban unemployment and elevate the country’s GDP growth rate to the 
9.23% and 10.65% range. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation contributes to the study of the Chinese economy by elaborating China’s 
alternative economic system, examining the evolution of Chinese environmental policies, and 
proposing a Chinese Green Job Guarantee.  
Delineating China’s political economy post-1949, I challenge the Eurocentric 
interpretation of China’s post-1978 economic reform as an incomplete and ongoing transition. To 
understand the Chinese economy, the question to ask is not whether China today is capitalist or 
socialist, or whether the Chinese government is interfering too much with the market, but rather 
what kind of a market economy could best fulfill the developmental vision set by the Chinese 
state. The Chinese economy has transformed into a distinct type of market economy – “Socialist 
Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics” – that is defined by the dominant, evolving, and 
developmental role of the Chinese state in economic and social processes. The Chinese economic 
system should be viewed as an addition to Hyman Minsky’s “fifty-seven” varieties of capitalism 
(1991), not an anomaly in some ongoing and incomplete transition towards a predetermined end.  
I divide the first essay into three sections to survey the transformative role of the Chinese 
state. Section I examines the origin of political legitimacy and the dominant role of the Chinese 
state as represented by the Chinese Communist Party (thereafter CCP) in planning the socialist 
era between 1949 and 1978. Section II illustrates the evolving role of the Chinese state in dictating 
the pace and direction of China’s market-oriented reforms between 1978 and 2002. Section III 
investigates the developmental role of the Chinese state in furthering reforms (though not 
necessarily market-oriented) after 2002, with an emphasis on China’s techno-industrial policy. 
While it is difficult to present the totality of the evolving “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” I hope to convince my readers that China’s political economy ushers a different 
2 
 
yet viable political and economic ideology that challenges the Western free market ideal. China’s 
political economy also suggests that the country is in a solid political and institutional position to 
take advantage of creative public policies such as a Green JG to engineer full employment and 
environmental sustainability. 
I argue in the second essay that in attempting to build an ecological civilization, Chinese 
environmental policies have largely evolved from contradiction to synthesis since 2005. Echoing 
my first essay on China’s alternative political and economic system (which is defined by the 
dominant, evolving, and developmental role of the Chinese state in economic and social 
processes), I argue that the Chinese state has been and will be shaping China’s environmental 
landscape more responsively and effectively now and into the future. 
I divide the second essay into four sections. Section I briefly surveys the reality of China’s 
dual economic and environmental crises that has led to contradictions in China’s environmental 
policies. Section II examines the debate between mainstream environmental economics and 
heterodox ecological economics regarding the relationship between the economy and the 
environment and the extent to which it is applicable to China. Section III examines China’s era of 
contradictory environmental policy and ineffective environmental governance from 1978 to 2005. 
Section IV elaborates the evolution of China’s environmental policy from contradiction to 
synthesis since 2005. While it is difficult to present the totality of China’s environmental policy 
climate, I hope to demonstrate to readers that China’s environmental policy today is in a 
historically stronger political and institutional position to take advantage of creative public policies 
such as a Green JG to engineer environmental sustainability while achieving and maintaining full 
employment. 
Finally, I demonstrate in the third essay that the Chinese state should and can implement 
a Chinese Green JG to coordinate economic growth, full employment, structural adjustments, and 
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environmental sustainability. I first demonstrate that a Job Guarantee program is far more 
effective in creating jobs than the conventional macroeconomic policies that indirectly create jobs 
by stimulating economic growth. I then explain why China would especially benefit from a Green 
JG and why China’s time to implement it is ripe. Afterwards, I show that a Chinese Green JG is 
affordable. Increasing China’s fiscal deficit by 1.58% of 2019 GDP would have financed a 
complete Chinese Green JG to eliminate China’s the 24.27 million urban individuals currently 
unemployed and elevate China’s GDP growth rate to the 9.23% and 10.65% range in 2019. 
Combined with the many other benefits of a green and fully employed economy, such as 
economic, social, and political stabilities and environmental sustainability, a Chinese Green JG is 
well worth it. Moreover, since a Green JG entails increased deficit spending, I examine the 
sustainability and functionality of Chinese government deficits (and government deficits in 
general) by constructing and examining sector balances for three representative countries – China, 
the U.S., and Greece. My conclusion is that China’s deficit spending to finance the Green JG is 
not only sustainable but also functional. Finally, I explore the design of a Chinese Green JG, such 
as how it should be administered, what jobs it could create, and why China should adopt a 
gradualist approach in order to implement it. 
I divide the third essay into five sections. Section I introduces what a Job Guarantee is. I 
explain its advantages against the conventional tools of addressing unemployment. Section II 
explains why China would especially benefit from a Green JG. I investigate four major changes 
and challenges that have pressured China’s economic growth and employment in recent years. I 
then show how a Chinese Green JG promotes China’s economic growth and full employment 
while enhancing the Chinese state’s ability to tackle each of these four changes and challenges. In 
section III, I explain why China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe. In section IV, I estimate 
the economic benefits and costs of a full-fledged Chinse Green JG. In section V, I inquire into 
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the sustainability and functionality of China’s deficit spending. In section VI, I discuss the design 
of a Chinese Green JG and summarize my key findings in the conclusion section. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TRANSFORMATION, NOT TRANSITION: A CRITICAL SURVEY  
 
OF CHINA’S POLITCAL ECONOMY 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary purpose and contribution of this essay is to challenge the Eurocentric 
interpretation of China’s post-1978 economic reform as an incomplete and ongoing transition by 
orthodox economists. These economists either falsely predicted the “Coming Collapse of China”1 
because China did not transition to the Western ideal of liberal democracy and free market (Chang 
2001) or are still waiting for that transition to materialize (Naughton 2007, 2018)2. I argue that the 
Chinese economy did not, is not, and likely will not transition to the predetermined free market 
ideal assumed by the orthodox economists. On the contrary, the Chinese economy has 
transformed into a distinct type of market economy – “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese 
Characteristics” – that is defined by the dominant, evolving, and developmental role of the 
Chinese state in economic and social processes. The Chinese economic system should be viewed 
as an addition to Hyman Minsky’s “fifty-seven” varieties of capitalism (1991), not an anomaly in 
some ongoing and incomplete transition towards a predetermined end. 
I divide the paper into three sections to survey the transformative role of the Chinese state 
by delineating the political economy of China post-1949. Section I examines the origin of political 
legitimacy and the dominant role of the Chinese state as represented by the Chinese Communist 
Party (thereafter CCP) in planning the socialist era between 1949 and 1978. Section II illustrates 
 
1 In his 2001 book, The Coming Collapse of China, Chang argued that China was a country full of contradictions and 
predicted the political and economic collapse of China by 2006. He had since revised his prediction to 2012. 
2 Naughton is a well-respected western scholar on the Chinese economy. Naughton held the “transition” thesis and 
expressed his concern over the peculiar incompleteness of China’s economic reform in his 2007 book, The Chinese 
Economy: Transitions and Growth. However, his “transition” thesis seems to have somewhat softened in his 2018 
edition of the book, which is retitled, The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth. 
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the evolving role of the Chinese state in dictating the pace and direction of the market-oriented 
reforms between 1978 and 2002. Section III investigates the developmental role of the Chinese 
state in furthering reforms (though not necessarily market-oriented) after 2002, with an emphasis 
on China’s techno-industrial policy. While it is difficult to present the totality of the evolving 
“Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics,” I hope to convince my readers that 
China’s political economy ushers a different yet viable political and economic ideology that 
challenges the Western free market ideal. China’s political economy also suggests that the country 
is in a solid political and institutional position to take advantage of creative public policies such as 
a Green JG to engineer full employment and environmental sustainability. 
I. State-Planning in the Socialist Era (1949-1978) 
 
At first glance, China’s political economy in the socialist era seems a distant past and thus 
irrelevant to my “transformation, not transition” thesis. However, this is far from being true due 
to the cumulative-causative nature of social historical processes. Just as Heilbroner sought to 
“begin the study of our economic system rather the way a doctor begins to become acquainted 
with a patient – by taking its history,” I aim to theorize the evolving and the developmental role 
of the Chinese state in China’s post-1978 economic reforms by first investigating the dominant 
role of the Chinese state in shaping Socialist China from 1949 to 1978. 
A brief history is necessary to illustrate the historical role of the CCP. Prior to 1839, the 
First Opium War, China had been under dynasty rules for more than three thousand years. With 
a highly sophisticated traditional agriculture, by 1820, China accounted for 36% of world 
population and 33% of world GDP as an inward-oriented economy (Brant, Ma, and Rawski 2014). 
In the 1900s, however, China was plagued by a series of foreign invasion and domestic struggles, 
including the two Opium Wars against the British Empire, a war against the “Eight-Nation 
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Alliance”3, two Sino-Japanese Wars, the Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, and the civil war 
between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. In 1949, after defeating the Nationalist 
Party, the Chinese Communist Party established new China. 
It is important to note that in addition to the CCP’s historical anti-colonial, anti-feudal, 
and anti-imperial efforts, China’s traditional culture also helped legitimize the ruling of the CCP 
and the single party leadership system. While Taoism and Buddhism were more applicable to 
traditional Chinese’ personal quest for peace and enlightenment, Confucianism had long been 
China’s most influential social and political philosophy that emphasized order, hierarchy, and 
benevolence.4  The notions of order, hierarchy, and benevolence are intricately linked to the 
Chinese ideal of harmony, which mandates that for a society to achieve and maintain harmony, 
those at the top shall rule and those below shall follow, provided that the rule is benevolent. 
Therefore, a benevolent and capable CCP that represents the interests of the people is the 
equivalence of a capable and benevolent emperor of the past. This has indeed been China’s social 
contract and a Confucianist5 way to achieve social order, which is in stark contrast to the Western 
modern political ideal of liberal democracy6 . Nevertheless, the Confucianist influence is well 
documented in China and other East Asian countries7 that have a strong state and a market 
economy heavily influenced by the state. 
After explaining the historical role and the origin of political legitimacy of the CCP, I now 
examine the dominant role of the Chinese state in shaping socialist China. The socialist China, 
from 1949 to 1978, was a period heavily influenced by Mao and was characterized by the “Big 
 
3 The “Eight-Nation Alliance” included Austria-Hungary, British Empire, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
and the U.S. 
4 Benevolence is part of the “Five Virtues” that also include righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness. 
5 Perhaps for this reason, traditional Confucianist values (not Taoism or Buddhism) have been celebrated by the 
Chinese state consistently, evidenced by its inclusion in most levels of the public education curriculum.  
6 The modern Western democracy today is widely believed to be achievable only through popular voting. However, 
there had been different ways to achieve democracy in the past, such as sortition in ancient Greece. 
7 For example, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Singapore. 
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Push Development Strategy” (thereafter “Big Push”). The “Big Push” featured high public 
investment, low private consumption, heavy industry priority, and an unusually high R&D to GDP 
ratio (Lardy 1987). In comparison, South Korea and Taiwan at the time quickly oriented 
themselves to pursue export-led economic growth by focusing on the manufacture of light 
consumer goods. Hence, the heavy-industry-priority development strategy was a conscious choice 
made by the Chinese state to jumpstart a different path of industrialization.  
There were several reasons for the Chinese state/CCP to pursue heavy industrialization. 
First, heavy industry, as an upstream industry, is strategic with many industrial linkages to 
downstream industries. The vision of the Chinese state was for the domestic industry to start from 
the upstream and then gradually move downstream, which meant moving from heavy 
industrialization to light industrialization by sacrificing the availability of consumption goods in 
the short term. Second, China at the time received substantial technical and personnel aid from 
the Soviet Union, and thus had an incentive to adopt the Soviet Union’s path of heavy 
industrialization. Third, the trade bans and sanctions from the West pushed China to achieve some 
levels of self-sufficiency, which reinforced the heavy-industry-priority and import-substitution-
industrialization. Finally, the recent traumatic experience with foreign invasion and China’s status 
as a Communist country prompted the Chinese state to heavily fund military R&D, which resulted 
in the “two bombs and one missile”8 and an unusually high R&D to GDP ratio9 in the socialist 
era. 
Therefore, the purpose of the Chinese state to adopt the heavy-industry-priority strategy 
was for China, a communist country, to achieve some levels of self-sufficiency and self-defense in 
the context of global capitalism. With this goal in mind, the Chinese state also enacted pricing 
 
8 “Two bombs” refer to the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb; “one missile” refers the intercontinental missile. 
9 China’s R&D to GDP ratio reached 1.7% in 1964, while comparable low-income countries typically have less than 
1%. 
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policies with Chinese characteristics. Since socialist China forbad profit incentives, prices were set 
to effectuate the necessary exchange among different inputs for their respective production and 
to create the kind of income distribution that conforms to the political vision of the state. As the 
Chinese socialist state was determined to develop its industry, it priced agricultural produce 
intentionally low and industrial outputs intentionally high (Lardy 1987). This was also the same 
period that China instituted a duel-citizenship system – the Household Registration System. By 
specifying a citizen’s status as either rural or urban, the Household Registration System provided 
the means for the state to restrict rural-urban mobility, especially when a rural status meant poverty 
under socialist China’s industrialization strategy (Lin and Yang 2000). For almost thirty years, the 
Chinese rural economy subsidized its industrial urban sector, which was a root cause for the rural-
urban divide that still profoundly impacts China today. 
It is also important to note that between 1949 and 1978, unemployment remained a foreign 
concept to socialist China. Traditional Chinese culture has long been critical of money-making as 
a worthy pursuit of life. Then in socialist China, which was heavily influenced by Maoism and 
Marxism, economic production was deemed as satisfying consumption needs, not as realizing 
monetary profits. Hence, in the systemic level, socialist China did not have unemployment because 
its production and employment decisions were divorced from profit motives. Production and 
employment were to fulfill social reproduction and stability, not maximizing monetary profits. 
Similarly, the level of employment in socialist China was not a product of profit 
maximization but a consequence of political and social determination. Since full employment was 
a desirable social goal, it was engineered to occur. In the technical level of creating and maintaining 
full employment, the Chinese state developed two separate social and economic institutions. First, 
in urban China, in which production was organized by the state-owned enterprises (thereafter 
SOEs), job placement and lifetime employment were both guaranteed. This effectively eliminated 
10 
 
urban unemployment. Then, in rural China, in which rural agricultural collectives were established 
to organize rural labor force for agricultural production, full employment was achieved via a 
“work-point” system. Rural land was pooled and worked in common by the Agricultural 
Collectives. As a basic accounting unit, an Agricultural Collective organized agricultural 
production, distributed net income to individual households based on work points, and financed 
social services performed by teachers and paramedics. 
Therefore, unemployment, if existed, would have been an absurd concept in socialist 
China – if someone was willing, able, and ready to work and contribute to the building of new 
China, why is s/he prohibited from doing so? However, it must be noted that full employment in 
socialist China was achieved with a noticeable cost – productive inefficiency. This was evident in 
both urban and rural China. In urban China, since job placement and lifetime employment were 
both guaranteed and that different SOEs were not meant to compete with one another, there 
accumulated a significant portion of “redundant workers”10 that were later laid off during the SOE 
restructuring during the post-1978 economic reform. In rural China, on the other hand, 
agricultural productivity growth was slow under the Agricultural Collectives system. In 
comparison, China’s agricultural growth accelerated significantly after 1978 when the Household 
Contracting system replaced the Agricultural Collectives system. The desire to design an economic 
system that is efficient and dynamic became the major impetus for China’s introduction of a 
market economy post-1978. 
It appeared that the “Big Push”, administered pricing, urban-rural divide, and the 
engineering of full employment would accompany socialist China for a long time to come. 
However, two tragic movements contributed to the demise of the socialist system and the eventual 
reform of the Chinese economy and society in 1978. As Naughton suggests, “the twists and turns 
 
10 An official phrase used by the Chinese state to describe the excess labor in the SOEs. 
11 
 
in policy in Maoist China are generally narrated from a political point of view” (2007). Both 
movements were initiated by Mao. The “Great Leap Forward” movement was in effect an extreme 
version of the “Big Push” strategy, which mandated China’s human and non-human resources to 
be devoted almost entirely to the development of heavy industries. The scarce resources available 
for agricultural production, combined with three consecutive years of bad weather from 1958 to 
1960, produced one of the most devastating famines in human history with 30 million deaths 
(Ashton 1984). Mao lost prestige within the party.  
But in 1966, Mao reasserted his leadership by claiming that dangerous capitalistic elements 
had infiltrated China and polluted the minds of people, including communist party members and 
ordinary citizens. Therefore, a Cultural Revolution was necessary to purge remnants of capitalist 
and the backward traditional ideas in the Chinese society. To China’s liberal intellectuals at the 
time, the Cultural Revolution was a traumatic experience. As the Cultural Revolution aims to 
disinfect the military, the urban workplace, and the communist party itself, more than 2.5 million 
people (including senior communist party leaders) were labeled pro-capitalists or revisionists 
(Joseph, Wong, and Zweig 1991). They were persecuted via public humiliation, imprisonment, 
torture, and seizure of property. The Cultural Revolution lasted ten years until Mao’s death in 
1976. 
Above I have examined the dominant role of the Chinese state as represented by the CCP 
in shaping Socialist China from 1949 to 1978. Clearly, the vision of the Chinese state dominated 
economic and social processes in socialist China. The “Big Push,” heavy-industry-priority, “two 
bombs and one missile,” administered pricing, urban-rural divide, the Household Registration 
System, the engineering of full employment, the creation of SOEs and Agricultural Collectives, 
and even the GFL and the Cultural Revolution were all testaments to the dominance of the 
Chinese state as represented by the CCP. The result was a socialist China that: (1) was not profit-
12 
 
oriented; (2) lacked economic mobility but had economic security; (3) lacked per capita income 
but had income equality; and 4) inherited profound lessons from the GFL and the Cultural 
Revolution.  
II. State-Directing in the Market-Oriented Reform Era (1978-2002) 
 
Scholars such as Chang and Naughton cited China’s introduction of a market economy 
post-1978 as evidence of the “transition” argument. Their logic is that marketization and a profit-
oriented economy will inevitably push China to converge to the Western ideal of liberal democracy 
and free market. However, this could not be further from the truth. The Chinese state had dictated 
the pace and direction of its market-oriented reform from 1978 to 2002. Perhaps Chang’s incorrect 
prediction of the “Coming Collapse of China” was rooted in his conviction of an oversimplified 
relationship between the market and the state. While the state/government is often presented as 
an exogenous and disruptive entity to an idealized free market economy in mainstream economics, 
the reality seems to be the opposite for China’s reform experience. That is, in China, there has 
always been the state (be it a dynasty, CCP, or any collective authority), and then the state designs 
a market system that is quantitatively and qualitatively conducive to its vision for the country. This 
is a key differentiating factor for China’s “Socialist Economy with Chinese Characteristics.” I now 
explain how the Chinese state decided the terms of its market economy by dictating the pace and 
the direction of its market-oriented reform from 1978 to 2002.  
The traumatic experience of socialist China, combined with a sluggish economy (when 
compared to the rapid economic growth of South Korea and Taiwan at the time), left profound 
lessons for the Chinese state. There was a general dissatisfaction with the standard socialist system 
within the party as well as a willingness to experiment and revise the existing economic and social 
institutions. Such tension culminated after Mao’s death in 1976. A market-oriented reform led by 
Deng, Xiaoping started in 1978.  
13 
 
However, China’s market-oriented reform did not simply mean “let the market be” by 
transitioning to the Western model of liberal democracy and free market without modification. A 
central question of market-oriented reform was regarding the relationship between economic 
growth and system transformation. The “big bang” approach, which was adopted by many Eastern 
European countries in their reforms, asserts that a systemic transition is a necessary condition for 
significant economic growth. For example, in its Post-Soviet market-oriented reforms, Boris 
Yeltsin (1991-1999) with the advisory of Jeffery Sachs adopted reform radicalism that included 
ending the Communist Party’s political and economic monopoly, rapid price liberalization by 
1991, rapid trade liberalization by 1992, and a rapid privatization program that privatized 70% of 
Russian SOEs in 5 years (Rosser and Rosser 2018). This shock therapy might have been a well-
meaning attempt by Yeltsin to transition Russia’s political and economic landscape to the Western 
ideal, but it was generally viewed as a failure as the rapidly transitioning Russia suffered 25-40% 
output collapse, large current account deficits, large budget deficits (5.4% of GDP in 1991 to 
42.6% in 1998), hyperinflation, massive capital flight, and the domination of oligarchs. As Rosser 
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and Rosser suggest, Yeltsin’s rapid marketization, monetization, and privatization failed to 
improve efficiency and societal satisfaction11 (2018). 
In the case of China, however, the situation was quite different. The Chinese state had 
purposefully engineered the introduction of a market economy via a gradualist and pragmatist 
approach while maintaining the paramount leadership of the state in the process (Byrd 1991). 
Hence, the relationship between economic growth and system transition never became a difficult 
choice for China. As Deng famously stated as early as in 1962, “it doesn’t matter if a cat is black 
or white, so long as it catches mice.” In other words, it doesn’t matter if a policy is labelled capitalist 
or socialist/communist, so long as it addresses economic issues. This pragmatist approach, 
combined with the Chinese state’s determination to maintain its leadership role (as opposed to 
Yeltsin’s dismantling the Russian Communist Party monopoly) and the Chinese state’s recognition 
of its own ignorance of the market economy and uncertainty about the future12, produced an 
economic reform that seemed peculiar to both free market economists and orthodox Marxists. It 
is perhaps this peculiarity that renders many labeling China as “state capitalism,” or, as China calls 
itself, “a socialist economy with Chinese characteristics” (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). 
 
11  
12 Deng argued that China must approach economic reform like “crossing the river by groping for the stone.” 
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Following Deng’s “black cat, white cat” principle, China’s 1978-2002 market-oriented 
economic reform can be categorized into two distinct periods. The first period of reform from 
1978 to 1993 began in the rural economy. Recognizing that the socialist “Big Push” strategy had 
burdened the peasants for decades, the Chinese state initiated a series of rural reforms that will 
“give farmers a chance to catch their breath” (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). This included a reduced 
procurement target, an increased procurement price, and even the allowing of peasants to sell their 
agricultural surplus at a market price (Naughton 2007). Therefore, a dual-track price system was 
established to slowly introduce the institution of market prices to the Chinese economy without 
destroying the old administered prices. Furthermore, decision-making autonomy was granted to 
agricultural collectives, which ultimately resulted in household land-contracting that replaced the 
communal method of agricultural production in the socialist period. By 1984, just six years after 
the reform, China had produced enough food (mostly grains) for its people, which was especially 
encouraging given the tragic experience of the recent famine (Naughton 2007).  
Meanwhile in the urban economy, public ownership continued to dominate during phase 
one of the reform (1978-1993). The privatization process was gradual, and the SOEs continued 
to assume their economic, social, and political functions. One of the notable functions as 
continuously assumed by the SOEs was the maintenance of full employment. Once an urban 
person graduated from schooling, s/he would be placed directly into an urban work unit. The 
employment was expected to be permanent and entailed generous benefits. This included 
inexpensive housing, inexpensive daycare centers (often as a subsidiary of the SOE) for the 
children of the employee, subsidized breakfast and lunch, and so on (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). 
Consequently, China’s first reform period was relatively smooth and labeled as a “reform 
without losers” (Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000) In comparison, China’s phase two reform (from 
1993 to 2002) was much more aggressive and was labeled by Naughton as a “reform with losers” 
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(2007). It included the ending of the dual-track system, the restructuring of the SOEs via the 
passing of The Company Law in 1994, and China joining the WTO in 2001. The hope was to spur 
more economic growth even at the expense of economic security of some segments of the 
population. One of the important areas of reform was on the restructuring of the SOEs, which 
meant that many SOEs were either downsized or privatized to improve their financial 
performance and competitiveness in the international market. This pushed monetary efficiency 
incentive into the forefront and social consideration into the background.  
As SOEs were downsized and privatized, they started laying off workers. The economic 
and social impact was so enormous that a new term – Xiagang – was invented to describe the 50 
million laid-off workers from public employment from 1993 through 2003 (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). 
Thus, in order to introduce a market economy, which was believed to be more competitive and 
dynamic, the Chinese state accelerated the pace of the market-oriented reform and had to deal 
with the challenge of unemployment ever since. The Chinese state even encouraged early 
retirement so that more jobs would be available for young people. However, although the state 
enacted reemployment and training programs to buffer the shock, many still could not find jobs 
in the formal economy. Consequently, an informal economy developed to absorb the excess labor 
force by providing insecure and low-paying jobs (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). 
Above I have shown how the Chinese state adopted a gradualist and pragmatist approach 
to dictate the pace of its market-oriented reform. The point is not to debate the efficacy of certain 
decisions made by the state per se. Rather, it is to illustrate that the Chinese state, unlike the Post-
Soviet Russia, did not simply “let the market work” by rapidly transitioning to a regime of price 
liberalization, trade liberalization, and privatization. While the Chinese state aimed to “cross the 
river” (i.e. to introduce market economy to China), it had done so by dictating the pace (gradualist) 
and nature (pragmatist) of the reform (Heilmann 2008). 
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Not only had the Chinese state dictated the pace of the reform, it had also shaped the 
direction and makeup of its market-oriented reform in several key areas, effectively creating a 
market economy with Chinese characteristics (Wu 2014). First, China’s market-oriented reform 
did not follow the neoliberal prescription of unreservedly opening its economy to FDI. Instead, 
the Chinese state adopted the “Northeast Asian” model13 to restrict FDI as part of the national 
industrial policy to provide both stimulus and infant-industry protection for nurturing its domestic 
enterprises. Therefore, while enjoying the various benefits of FDI (such as technology transfer 
and spillover, competition and emulation, and integration of Chinese firms to global supply chain), 
the Chinese state shielded its domestic enterprises from international competition for at least 15 
years since the start of the reform. Such a vision by the Chinese state translated into China’s FDI 
figures: during the 1980s, FDI accounted for only less than 1% of China’s GDP. FDI only surged 
in 1992 (the start of the phase two reform) to 6% due to a foreign real estate investment boom 
but then quickly decreased to 3% between 1999 and 2004 and just over 1% since 2014 (Naughton 
2018).  
It is also important to note that to accomplish its vision to provide infant-industry 
protection to domestic enterprises, the Chinese state used the Special Economic Zones (thereafter 
SEZs) along with “cautious, incremental, and localized policy changes” (Naughton 2018). During 
the 1980s, FDI grew primarily in China’s Southeastern export-oriented manufacturing provinces 
of Guangdong and Fujian. While the initial zones (with lower tax rate, simpler administrative 
procedures, and duty-free imports of components and supplies) were compatible with the free 
market ideal, they were mostly export-processing zones that only allowed the final products to be 
exported. It was not until 1992 that manufactures within these zones were granted rights to sell 
 
13 Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all restricted its FDI as part of their national industrial policies, with less than 1% 
of FDI to GDP ratio for the initial opening-up period. Even after relaxing the restriction, FDI to GDP ratio never 
exceeded 2%. 
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output within China. This again provided cushion for China’s domestic manufactures to catch up 
and emulate. Thus, with the usage of SEZs and restrictive FDI policies, the Chinese state had 
created favorable policy environment for its domestic enterprises to flourish. This was in stark 
contrast with the “Southeast Asian” pattern of FDI14 that attracted substantial foreign investment 
but found little success in developing noteworthy domestic enterprises. 
Another notable testament to the Chinese state’s dictating the direction and makeup of its 
market-oriented reform was in its policy support for the Township and Villages Enterprises 
(thereafter TVE). In hindsight, the TVEs were a tremendous success. From 1978 to 1996, the 
TVE share of industrial GDP increased from 9% to 27% (Naughton 2018). Moreover, the TVEs 
played an important catalytic role in China’s market-oriented reform by increasing rural income, 
diminishing the rural-urban gap, and absorbing excess rural labor. The reason for the success of 
the TVEs, despite their relatively unimpressive role during the socialist era, was largely due to the 
favorable state policies. As explained previously, the Chinese state began the initial market-
oriented reform in rural China with a general relaxation of the state monopoly on purchase of 
agricultural products. This allowed for more agricultural products to remain on rural markets and 
thus available for TVEs to process. In addition, the state also allowed the TVEs to share the 
monopoly rents (which were previously reserved for the SOEs) by encouraging SOEs to 
subcontract work to TVEs. Furthermore, a general institutional framework favoring the growth 
of the TVEs was created: 1) formal taxes were lowered on rural industry, so money stayed local; 
2) local governments acted as guarantors for TVEs, so bank credit was available; and 3) existing 
credit institutions (many of which were state-owned) were easily adapted to support the TVEs. 
Hence, China’s market-oriented reform did not simply let the competitive forces of the 
market weed out inefficient firms, nor did it aim to create a level playing field for different 
 
14 Such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines that had unrestrictive FDI policy and a 6% FDI to GDP ratio. 
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ownership types (such as TVEs, SOEs, and foreign firms).15 Rather, preferential policies were 
designed to support domestic enterprises and develop TVEs throughout the reform. Moreover, 
China’s market-oriented reform did not see privatization as an end in and of itself. Rather, the 
Chinese state utilized partial privatization of SOEs as a mean to improve productive efficiency 
and international competitiveness for enterprises of all ownership types. It is for this reason that 
despite the massive restructuring during the phase two reform16, SOEs have remained critical to 
the Chinese economy. The result was a tripod scenario by the end of the reform phase two, with 
the TVEs, SOEs, and private (including foreign) enterprises each accounting for approximately 
one-third of China’s industrial ownership (Wu 2014). 
Above I have demonstrated the evolving and directing role of the Chinese state in its 1978-
2002 market-oriented reform. While the state was determined to introduce a market economy to 
China, it had done so in its own terms. The Chinese state engineered a gradualist economic reform 
that included two distinct periods. It also dictated the terms of its market economy with Chinese 
characteristics by shaping restrictive FDI policies, setting up SEZs, creating favorable policy 
environment for the TVEs, and conditionally privatizing the SOEs. Therefore, China’s market-
oriented reform by no means signaled China’s transition to the Western ideal of liberal democracy 
and free market. If anything, it was a period during which the Chinese state reinvented itself while 
maintaining its directing role of the Chinese economy. Such political and economic transformation 
marked the beginning of China’s “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics.” 
III. A Developmental State from 2002 to the Present 
 
 
15 This is an important point of critique on the Chinese state by the “transition” theorists. However, I argue that it is 
precisely an important piece of evidence against the “transition” thesis. 
16 The restructuring of the SOEs followed the “grasping the large, and letting the small go” principle, which meant 
the retaining of state ownership in key industries, such as petroleum, telecommunication, and railroads, etc. 
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Since 2002, the Chinese economy has transformed even further away from the free market 
ideal by continuously writing its dictionary of a “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese 
Characteristics.” To demonstrate this, I highlight China’s initiation of a series of non-market-
oriented reforms, which was accompanied by a slowdown of market-oriented reforms, under the 
Hu-Wen administration from 2002 to 2012. I then focus on illustrating the developmental role of 
the Chinese state in shaping its techno-industrial policy under the current leadership of Xi Jinping 
and Li Keqiang. I argue that the Chinese state has become increasingly self-conscious of its 
“Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics” as a viable alternative economic system 
and has grown more confident in the system’s efficacy to realize China’s economic development 
and national rejuvenation. Hence, while “deepening reforms”17 has been repeatedly recognized as 
an official quest for the Chinese state, its direction is undoubtedly alongside with expanding and 
redefining the “Chinese Characteristics” of China’s market economy. More transformation, not 
transition, should be expected for the future of the Chinese economy. 
Hu Jintao’s “scientific developmentalism,” which sought a broader definition of 
development, seemed to have reaffirmed Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” 18  (2003). As 
Naughton remarks, “It was clear that market reforms had intensified very real social problems that 
now cried out for solutions. China’s social safety net – traditionally provided by state-owned 
enterprises and agricultural collectives – was in tatters. Whole new populations were emerging, 
such as rural-to-urban migrants and new small-scale businesses, that were not covered at all. Other 
social services, notably education and health, had been underfunded for years...” (2018). Thus, the 
Hu-Wen administration aimed to address the very real social, economic, and environmental issues 
 
17 http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/sbjszqhwzn/index.htm 
18 The notion that after playing a pivotal role in establishing appropriate institutions to foster a market economy, the 
state then initiates a countermovement to deal with the perversity of the market by expanding its role in social 
protection 
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that resulted from China’s adoption of a market economy. A series of non-market-oriented 
reforms were carried out to rebuild social services (such as health insurance), support agriculture 
via tax cuts, craft robust industrial policies, and reverse environmental degradation19 (Naughton 
2018). 
Perhaps the most notable non-market-oriented reform of the Chinese state as represented 
by the Hu-Wen administration was regarding the Chinese countryside that saw a significant 
deterioration of social service during the market-oriented reform era. There were three pillars of 
state policy in this regard. First, policy efforts were made to narrow the urban-rural divide. This 
was achieved by “raising rural income by eliminating the ‘urban bias’ in economic policy; reducing 
the salience of the urban hukou in order to create a single unified form of citizenship; and the 
strengthening of farmer property rights in land” (Naughton 2018). Second, a general framework 
to create the “New Socialist Countryside” was established to “give more, take less, and enliven” 
the Chinese peasants. This included the abolition of all agricultural taxes facing peasants (which 
increased agricultural income by 5%), the re-establishing of the healthcare system that was 
dismantled during the market-oriented reform (by 2013, the New Cooperative Medical System 
covers 97% of rural residents), and the substantial state-funding for elementary and middle school 
education for rural residents.  
Finally, an aggressive policy package that supports peasants and agriculture was put in 
place. This included significant direct payments and “general input” subsidies for grain producers 
(e.g. in 2012, payments and subsidies accounted for 2.4% of agricultural value-added), subsidies 
and developmental funds for specific input or project such as improved seeds and machinery (e.g. 
in 2011, these funds accounted for 4% of agricultural value-added), and support prices for major 
 
19 Most of these efforts have been continued and expanded under the current Xi-Li administration. 
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agricultural commodities (which allowed the state to act as the buyer of last resort to stabilize rural 
agricultural income when needed) (Naughton 2018). 
In addition to the Chinese state’s above effort to rebuild social service and support 
agriculture, it has also taken steps to develop robust industrial policy, reverse environmental 
degradation20, and respond to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis with state-led super-Keynesian 
policies (Wu 2013). Thus, the Chinese state during the 2002-2012 Hu-Wen administration had 
focused on initiating a series of non-market-oriented reforms. In comparison, China’s market-
oriented reforms stalled in this period, as Naughton laments, “it slowly became apparent that the 
political commitment to introducing new market-oriented reforms and implementing reforms 
already adopted had weakened dramatically” (2018). China’s slowdown of market-oriented reform 
was perceived quite negatively, as Naughton expresses his frustration, “How could China’s 
leadership have valued so lightly something [market-oriented reforms] so overwhelmingly 
beneficial?” The answer to Naughton’s question, however, should be clear to my readers: the 
Chinese state, with its pragmatist approach to reforms, is neither for nor against the market per 
se. The question is not whether China should have the market or not, but rather what kind of 
market that would best fulfill the developmental vision set by the state. This has indeed been the 
approach taken by the Xi-Li administration since 2012, to which I now turn my analysis. 
It is clear from the onset of the Xi-Li administration (2012-present) that the Chinese state 
has two primary visions for its economy: a continuous determination to the market economy and 
a continuous search for and expansion of the Chinese characteristics of that market economy (Wu 
2014). The former seems relatively straightforward as Premier Li Keqiang declared, “Reform is 
like sailing a boat against the current; if you don’t move forward, you will be pushed backwards” 
(Li 2012). The latter, however, is more nuanced. I first summarize Xi’s vision for China under the 
 
20 For details, see my second essay on China’s environmental policy.  
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broader pursuit of “high quality development” as he elaborated during the 19th National Congress 
of the CCP in 2017. I then survey the developmental role of the Chinese state in recent years in 
turning China into a techno-industrial state, which serves as a prime example about how the 
Chinese state as represented by the Xi administration has sought to engineer Chinese 
characteristics into its market economy. 
Xi’s vision for China starts with the “Chinese dream,” which centers around national 
rejuvenation (2012). Accordingly, the mission of the Chinese state as led by the CCP is to lead 
China to achieve national rejuvenation. In order to achieve this goal, “high quality development” 
shall be pursued that includes concrete manifestation for China’s political economy (Xi 2017). 
Politically, the Chinese state as represented by the CCP must establish and maintain an effective 
accountability system and the rule of law. This was evidenced by Xi’s anti-corruption campaign 
since 2012. The self-imposed checks of accountability and the determination to the rule of law are 
consistent with the Confucianist ideal of having a benevolent and capable state that rules the 
country benevolently and effectively. While the accountability system is an internal check for the 
state to self-regulate (like Singapore), the determination to the rule of law provides a strong 
external check if taken seriously. Xi’s political vision under the “high quality development” is 
therefore two-folded: strengthen the leadership role of the Chinese state as represented by the 
CCP and appropriately constrain its power by designing institutions to combat corruption and 
rent-seeking behaviors. The goal is to ensure that the Chinese state possesses the necessary 
qualifications to lead China to national rejuvenation, thereby actualizing the “Chinese dream.” 
The economic component to Xi’s “high quality development” is also multifaceted. 
Internationally, the Chinese state as led by Xi has initiated the monumental “one belt, one road” 
international infrastructure investment project (announced in 2013) that aims to strengthen 
infrastructure, economic trades, and cultural ties in more than 150 countries in Asia, Europe, 
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Africa, and the Americas. This echoes with Xi’s envisioning of peaceful development and of 
constructing the “community of common destiny for mankind,” which is premised on win-win 
international relations as opposed to the zero-sum thinking (which Xi calls “Cold War 
mentality”)21 (Xi 2014) Domestically, the Chinese state has carried out an ambitious economic 
program of “supply-side structural reform” to reduce excess capacity in heavy industries. While 
the abovementioned Belt and Road Initiative and “supply-side structural reform” reflect China’s 
“Socialist Economy with Chinese Characteristics,”22 in this paper, I survey the developmental role 
of the Chinese state as led by Xi in shaping China to become a techno-industrial state. 
It should be noted that the nationalistic tone for China’s techno-industrial policy was set 
as early as in 2003, since which successive waves of techno-industrial policy emerged and 
deepened. Compared to the previous decades of market-oriented reform (when targeted 
intervention was reduced), these new techno-industrial policies targeted specific strategic 
industries for promotion. First, in 2006, the Medium-Long Range Plan for Science and 
Technology (MLP) emerged to emphasize “indigenous innovation” by designating 16 
megaprojects (those with the largest and the most immediate spillovers to the economy) to be 
funded directly by the Chinese state. Then, in 2010, Strategic Emerging Industries (SEIs) emerged 
to encompass 20 industrial sectors grouped into 7 large groups. Unlike the MLP that involved 
direct government funding of R&D, the SEIs encouraged investment from the Chinese private 
sector by the state creating favorable conditions for businesses to develop and grow in these new 
industrial sectors. 
 
21 China under Xi’s leadership has also taken a greater role in international cooperation tackling climate change. 
22 The Belt and Road Initiative is a state-led infrastructure investment project in the international scale; the “supply-
side structural reform also does not fit the definition of market-oriented reform since it relies on direct government 
action, rather than market forces, to achieve its goals. 
25 
 
Whether it was the MLP or the SEI, the goal of the Chinese state was clear: create 
independent technological capabilities within China via China’s own “national champion” firms, 
which is consistent with Xi’s “Chinese Dream” that aspires for national rejuvenation. Hence, Xi’s 
administration not only deepened support for the MLP and SEI programs but also rolled out new 
waves of industrial policies that included the “Made in China 2025” and “Internet Plus.” While 
“Made in China 2025” aims to upgrade China’s manufacturing industry by 2025 to maintain 
China’s dominance in global manufacturing in the face of rising land, labor, and environmental 
costs, “Internet Plus” entails the Chinese state supporting the application of the Internet to all 
industries: healthcare, transportation, education, power infrastructure, and e-commerce, etc 
(Wubbeke et al. 2016).  
Hence, while the labor-intensive, low technological content, and low value-added 
manufacturing industries have been relocating to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India since the 2009 
Global Financial Crisis, the Chinese state has taken a developmental role to upgrade its industry 
to ensure that high-quality industrial production remains a prominent component of China’s 
economic development going forward. It is also interesting to note that “Made in China 2025” is 
similar to Germany’s “Industry 4.0” program. Both emphasize the use of information technology 
in industrial production; both envisage the use of industrial robots and automated processes; both 
required extensive government support. However, “Made in China 2025” as led by the Chinese 
state is much more ambitious as China’s manufacturing upgrading represents a bigger leap than 
Germany’s and that “China is devoting up to a hundred times as much money to industrial 
promotion [than Germany did]” (Wubbeke et al. 2016).23 
With the enormous financial support from the state, concrete policy implementations were 
carried out by ministries and local governments to actualize MLP, SEI, “Made in China 2025,” 
 
23 The German government spent less than $1 billion. 
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and “Internet Plus.” These techno-industrial policies generally include tax breaks, subsidized credit 
procurement preference, “high-technology enterprise” status, investment funds, demand-side 
policies, protection of intellectual property, exclusion of foreign technology giants, and liberal 
regulation of strategic emerging industries (Segal 2003; Wan 2009). While it is difficult to directly 
assess the efficacy of China’s techno-industrial policies in terms of total technical productivity, 
measures of knowledge creation, such as patents and scholarly articles, have exploded24, which 
serves as a plausible indication that China has been transforming into a more knowledge-based 
economy (Boeing, Philipp, and Mueller 2016; Fu, Frietsch, and Tagscherer 2013). 
Whether or not China’s ambitious techno-industrial policies (such as MLP, SEI, “Made in 
China 2025”, and “Internet Plus”) would succeed remains to be seen. However, they serve as a 
prime example of China’s “Socialist Economy with Chinese Characteristics.” The 
abovementioned techno-industries policies do not contradict China’s pursuit of a market 
economy; rather, they complement it by shaping its direction and characteristics. It is also 
important to note that the Chinese state has become increasingly self-conscious of its alternative 
economic system and has grown more confident in the system’s efficacy to realize China’s 
economic development and national rejuvenation. This is evident as Xi reiterated the “confidence 
doctrine” during the 19th Congressional Meeting of the CCP – “confidence in path, confidence in 
theory, confidence in system, and confidence in culture.” 
 
24 About half of patent applications were filed by foreign companies until 2014. Since then, Chinese domestic 
applications have accelerated and now account for 88% of invention patent application. Meanwhile, Chinese 
authors accounted for 12% of global scientific papers in 2011, up from 0.2% in 1980. China now produces the 
second largest number of scholarly articles annually, after the US, while the rate to which a Chinese article is cited is 
moving up steadily (Fu, Frietsch, and Tagscherer, 2013). 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I challenge the Eurocentric interpretation of China’s post-1978 economic 
reform as an incomplete and ongoing transition. By delineating China’s political economy post-
1949, I argue that the Chinese economy has transformed into a distinct type of market economy 
– “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics” – that is defined by the dominant, 
evolving, and developmental role of the Chinese state in economic and social processes. 
Specifically, I demonstrate that the vision of the Chinese state dominated economic and social 
processes in socialist China from 1949 to 1978. The “Big Push,” heavy-industry-priority, “two 
bombs and one missile,” administered pricing, urban-rural divide, the Household Registration 
System, the engineering of full employment, the creation of SOEs and Agricultural Collectives, 
and even the GFL and the Cultural Revolution were all testaments to the dominance of the 
Chinese state as represented by the CCP.  
I then examine China’s market-oriented reform from 1978 to 2002 and argue that it by no 
means signaled China’s transition to the Western ideal of liberal democracy and free market. 
Rather, the market-oriented reform was a period during which the Chinese state reinvented itself 
while maintaining its directing role of the Chinese economy. While the Chinese state was 
determined to introduce a market economy to China, it had done so in its own terms. It engineered 
a gradualist and pragmatist economic reform that included two distinct periods. The Chinese state 
also dictated the terms of its market economy with Chinese characteristics by shaping restrictive 
FDI policies, setting up SEZs, creating favorable policy environment for the TVEs, and 
conditionally privatizing the SOEs. 
Then, I survey China’s non-market-oriented reforms from 2002 to the present. The Hu-
Wen administration (2002-2012) aimed to address the very real social, economic, and 
environmental issues that resulted from China’s adoption of a market economy by carrying out a 
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series of non-market-oriented reforms to rebuild social services, support agriculture, tackle 
environmental degradation, and craft robust industrial policies. The Xi-Li administration (2012-
present) has deepened policy support in all these areas, especially regarding MLP and SEI. Xi’s 
“high quality development” has important implications for China’s political economy going 
forward. The political component of “high quality development” both strengthens the leadership 
role of the Chinese state as represented by the CCP and constrains its power by implementing an 
accountability system and the rule of law to combat corruption and rent-seeking behaviors. The 
economic component of “high quality development” centers around cooperative, green, and high-
tech development, which is embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative, “supply-side structural 
reform,” “Made in China 2025,” and “Internet Plus.” The vision of the Chinese state is also clearly 
defined – lead China to national rejuvenation, thereby realizing the “Chinese dream.” 
Finally, I argue that in order to truly understand the Chinese economy, the question to ask 
is not whether China should have the market or not, or whether the Chinese state is interfering 
too much with the market, but rather what kind of a market economy could best fulfill the 
developmental vision set by the Chinese state. It is also important to emphasize that the Chinese 
state today has two primary visions for its economy: a continuous determination to the market 
economy and a continuous search for and expansion of the Chinese characteristics of that market 
economy. It was, it is, and it will continue to be transformation, not transition, for the Chinese 
economy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CHINA’S ECOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION:  
 
FROM CONTRADICTION TO SYNTHESIS 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary purpose and contribution of this paper, however, is to examine China’s 
environmental reality and the evolution of China’s environmental policy after the country’s 1978 
economic reform. I argue that in attempting to build an ecological civilization, China’s 
environmental policy has evolved from contradiction to synthesis. Echoing my first essay on 
China’s alternative political and economic system (which is defined by the dominant, evolving, 
and developmental role of the Chinese state in economic and social processes), I argue that the 
Chinese state has been and will be shaping China’s environmental landscape more responsively 
and effectively now and into the future. 
I divide the paper into four sections. Section I briefly surveys the reality of China’s dual 
economic and environmental crises that has led to contradictions in China’s environmental 
policies. Section II examines the debate between mainstream environmental economics and 
heterodox ecological economics regarding the relationship between the economy and the 
environment and the extent to which it is applicable to China. Section III examines China’s era of 
contradictory environmental policy and ineffective environmental governance from 1978 to 2005. 
Section IV elaborates the evolution of China’s environmental policy from contradiction to 
synthesis since 2005. While it is difficult to present the totality of China’s environmental policy 
climate, I hope to demonstrate to readers that China’s environmental policy today is in a 
historically stronger political and institutional position to take advantage of creative public policies 
such as a Green JG to engineer environmental sustainability while achieving and maintaining full 
employment. 
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I. China’s Dual Crises of Unemployment and Environmental Degradation 
 
China’s mutually reinforcing and exacerbating economic and environmental challenges 
have led to contradictions in China’s environmental policy. At first glance, China does not seem 
to have a severe unemployment problem. Its official unemployment rate has been around 4% for 
decades, irrespective of business cycles. As far back as in the mid-1990s (when millions of state-
owned enterprise workers lost their jobs due to the economic restructuring) and as recent as in 
the 2008 global financial crisis (when China’s exports industry took a major hit), China’s official 
unemployment rates remained at 3.1% and 4%, respectively. The answer to such statistical 
absurdity seems to be the political concerns that had impacted the impartiality of the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Upon examination, one realizes that China’s unemployment rate is not internationally 
comparable by design. The National Bureau of Statistics of China computes the country’s official 
unemployment rate by using the registered urban unemployment rate, which is different from the 
international standard LFS-based (Labor Force Survey) unemployment rate. China’s urban 
registered unemployment rate has two features that tend to drastically understate the actual state 
of unemployment.  
First, the term, “registered,” means that one cannot be officially unemployed in China until 
s/he reports to the government. In comparison, the LFS-based unemployment rate, due to its 
very nature of household survey, includes those unemployed that have not reported to the state 
bureaucracy. Second, the term, “urban,” means that only urban Chinese25 are included in the 
computation of the unemployment rate. Rural Chinese, which accounts for 57.65% of China’s 
 
25 Each Chinese citizen is classified as either rural or urban by birth in the Household Registration Book, a legacy 
from the Socialist China. For details, see chapter 2. 
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total population as of 201826, are excluded from China’s computation of its official unemployment 
rate.27 
Hence, China’s surprisingly low and stable unemployment rate is a product by design. In 
recent years, China has begun to reform its unemployment statistical reporting. Since 2018, China 
has published the LFS-based unemployment rate for urban population, and the result is about one 
percentage point higher than the corresponding urban registered unemployment rate. If fully 
adopting the international standard,28 however, China’s true unemployment rate exceeds 8%, an 
estimate provided by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.29 
The estimate provided by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is probably on the 
conservative end. But even assuming a 5.2% urban unemployment rate, together with a 466.74 
million urban labor force, paints a very different picture for the Chinese economy – a mega 
economy that grows over 6% in 2019 but still has an unemployed population of 24.27 million 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2019). Whether it is the sheer size of the unemployment, 
or the 280 million peasant workers that are precariously employed in the cities, China continues 
to face a serious unemployment challenge that threatens its economic, social, and political stability 
ever since its second phase of economic reform in 1993. 
The economic and social pressure to maintain employment and promote economic growth 
has for decades contributed to the Chinese state’s reluctance to seriously tackle environmental 
issues. Various environmental indicators illustrate the magnitude of China’s accumulated 
environmental crisis. The most recent “Environmental Performance Index” (EPI) ranks China 
 
26 As classified by China’s Household Registration System. 
27 It is assumed that rural Chinese can always rely on peasantry in rural China for a livelihood, and thus can never be 
actually out of work. 
28 Computing LFS unemployment rate for the entire working age population, regardless of rural or urban status. 
29 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences is a premier academic research organization affiliated with the State 
Council of People’s Republic of China. 
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120th out of 180 countries in 2018, which puts China behind Russia (52nd) and Brazil (69th) and 
only ahead of India (177th) among the BRIC nations (Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy 
2019). Most of the countries low in the ranking are nations that face more direct political or 
economic emergencies. In the case of China, however, its relatively low position in the EPI ranking 
reflects the contradictions in the country’s environmental policies for the most years since the 
1978 economic reform, such as the late introduction of policies to reduce fossil fuels dependency 
in the early 2000 (Piovani 2017). Hence, as one of the fastest growing economies, China has 
experienced rapid environmental degradation in the past three decades, with an environmental 
sustainability index now near the bottom of the world 30 . China’s environmental crises are 
particularly evident in the areas of air pollution, water contamination, and land erosion. 
The seriousness of China’s air pollution is well documented. As of 2016, China has the 
fifth highest death rate in the world in terms of the percentage of premature death as caused by 
air pollution (McCarthy 2018). According to Greenpeace, “in 2017, average PM2.5 [air pollutants 
that seriously affects human health] concentrations in Beijing exceeded World Health 
Organization (WHO) air quality guidelines by nearly sixfold, and by almost fourfold in Shanghai.” 
Furthermore, “in the 338 cities for which monitoring data is available, average PM2.5 
concentrations amounted to 4.3 times the WHO guideline” (Greenpeace 2018). Ozone depletion 
is also a major concern in China, as “average ozone exposure in China rose 17% between 2014 
and 2017, an increase which caused an estimated 12,000 premature deaths per year” (Greenpeace 
2018). China’s air pollution requires immediate public response.  
Meanwhile, China’s water contamination is also pressing. Population growth and 
industrialization, coupled with loose environmental regulation, have exacerbated China’s water 
 
30 According to the Environmental Sustainability Index composed by the Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center at Columbia University.  
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contamination and shortage. As shown in a 2014 Chinese government report, 59.6% of China’s 
underground water is classified as “bad” or “very bad.” By 2017, China has established 12,226 
monitor sites to monitor the quality of surface water across the country. The Institute of Public 
and Environmental Affairs reports that, of these 12,226 sites, “just 35% have water of good 
quality, another 32% are suitable for water supply, 20% are suitable for industrial or agricultural 
use – but not for human contact – and 13% are useless. Even in Shanghai, one of China’s richest, 
most environmentally-aware and modern cities, 52 out of 65 monitoring sites have water not 
suitable for human contact” (Webber 2017). The result is that “two-thirds of China's 656 cities 
(with 390 million people) suffer shortages of water for domestic and industrial use” (Li 2016). 
China is additionally plagued by land erosion, especially due to deforestation and 
desertification. It is estimated that illegal logging consumes around 5,000 square kilometers of 
virgin forest every year in China. According to China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the 
use of disposable chopsticks alone consumes up to 1.3 million cubic meters of timber every year. 
Furthermore, deforestation compounds desertification, as “the rate of desertification in China is 
around 900 square miles a year, an area nearly the size of Rhode Island, with an area the size of 
New Jersey becoming desert every five years.” However, it must be noted that, compared to air 
and water pollution, China’s deforestation and desertification have been much better tackled in 
recent years. The public policies underlying China’s massive reforestation and anti-desertification 
efforts are precursors to the Green JG program that I am proposing, which I explore in the 3rd 
essay. 
China’s dual economic and environmental crises, as highlighted above, are mutually 
reinforcing and exacerbating. China’s 8% unemployment rate mandates an ever-growing economy 
to absorb the excess labor supply and maintain economic and social stability. However, doing so 
may further deteriorate the environment. On the other hand, China’s worsening environmental 
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crises call for a structural economic reform away from heavy and polluting industries. But then 
again, doing so may exacerbate unemployment and erode social stability. It is this economic-
environmental tradeoff that has led to contradictions in China’s environmental policies following 
the country’s 1978 economic reform, which has rendered China’s pursuit of a green civilization a 
distant future for the most years after the reform. 
II: The Economy and the Environment in China 
 
After presenting China’s reality of dual economic and environmental crises, I turn to 
economic literatures to survey the debate between mainstream environmental economics and 
heterodox ecological economics regarding the relationship between the economy and the 
environment and the extent to which it is applicable to China. I argue that mainstream 
environmental economics has explained the contradictions in China’s earlier environmental 
policies albeit with a flawed analysis. Meanwhile, heterodox ecological economics seems to be 
consistent with China’s instrumental environmental policies in more recent years. 
Mainstream environmental economics is appropriately a subfield of neoclassical 
economics in that it retains most of the latter’s theoretical foundation. Under normal 
circumstances, the intersection of an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping 
demand curve determines a set of equilibrium quantity and price in a goods market that most 
efficiently allocates scarce resources according to tastes and preferences of market participants. 
The existence of environmental degradation in the face of market allocation therefore entails two 
broad categories of explanation within mainstream environmental economics. 
The first explanation is that environmental degradation occurs because a clean 
environment does not reflect the tastes and preferences of existing market participants. This 
argument can be best illustrated by the environmental Kuznets curve (thereafter EKC), which 
hypothesizes that as economic growth occurs, environmental degradation worsens at first and 
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then, after per capita income reaches a certain level, improves as economic growth continues to 
develop. Thus, this model has been frequently applied to justify environmental exploitation in 
China and other developing countries where per capita income is assumed to be lower than the 
turning point level of per capita income in the EKC (Stern 2004).  
The economic interpretation of the EKC is that at the early stage of economic 
development, people has lower per capita income and is, therefore, more willing to exploit the 
environment for economic benefits. As people become richer, however, their taste and preference 
structure changes to prefer a cleaner environment. 
 
 
 Figure 1.  Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
The implication of the environmental Kuznets curve seems ironic: the best way to resolve 
environmental issues is to promote quantitative economic growth, which is what caused 
environmental degradation in the first place. Numerous critiques have been made to the EKC 
argument, ranging from its problematic assumption of sustainable economic development to its 
weak econometrics and problems in pollutant specification (Yandle, Vijayaraghavan, and Bhattarai 
2004). Nonetheless, the EKC is consistent with mainstream environmental economics, which 
suggests that environmental degradation in the face of efficient market allocation is a matter of 
revealed tastes and preferences. 
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The other explanation is the market failure argument. In this case, it is possible that market 
participants do value the environment. However, the problem is that the market has failed to 
reflect people’s environmental tastes and preferences in the case of a Pigouvian negative externality 
(Pigou 1920). Such a negative externality is the failure of market participants to internalize all 
relevant external costs in their decision making, and thus may adversely affect other people who 
bear the cost (Pigou 1920). A negative externality thus leads to overproduction. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Pigouvian Negative Externality 
 
Since environmental degradation is due to market failures, the solution is to correct them 
via proper state intervention. This is done by estimating the excluded external costs and 
augmenting them to the firm’s private costs. This will ensure that the firm’s level of production 
would reflect the optimal utilization of resources and society’s tastes and preferences. Public 
policies should, therefore, focus on the institution of “Pigouvian taxes.” After the elimination of 
negative externalities, a society achieves its optimal level of pollution. 
I argue that mainstream environmental economics has explained the contradictions in 
China’s earlier environmental policies albeit with a flawed analysis. To give the EKC thesis credit, 
China has indeed sacrificed its environment for economic gains for the most part of its post-1978 
economic reforms. These sacrifices ranged from the reliance of the economically cheap but 
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environmentally costly coal as the primary source of energy generation to the loose 
implementation of environmental protections laws in order to establish China’s manufacturing 
dominance globally. However, to believe in the self-adjusting implication of the EKC argument 
would be misleading and dangerous. It is difficult to argue that the numerous environmental crises 
in China today, such as the “Beijing Smog” and the desertification of arable land, reflect the tastes 
and preferences of the Chinese people or the Chinese state. China’s environment had continued 
to worsen even as environmental concerns replaced land dispute as China’s major cause of social 
unrest.  
The correlation between economic growth and environmental degradation as 
hypothesized in the EKC is not necessarily causative. Perhaps the United States reversed some of 
its environmental degradation not by hitting a per capita income level so magical that Americans 
no longer exploit the environment for additional incomes. Instead, the United States might have 
reversed some of its environmental degradation by exporting pollutant industries to other 
countries (such as China) that could produce goods more cheaply and thus more profitably. This 
suggests that we must not expect environmental degradation in China to fix itself with mere more 
economic growth. In the case of China, as the Chinese state is determined to maintain its 
manufacturing dominance, it cannot eliminate environmental degradation by simply exporting its 
manufacturing sector abroad and solely focusing on developing the service sector. While countries 
like Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh continued to absorb the low-skill and low-cost manufacturing 
jobs from China, China must actively address any existing issues with its environment. 
Regarding the negative externality argument, China has indeed been following its policy 
prescription by enacting various kinds of pollution taxes ever since 1982. However, it is 
inconceivable that these pollution taxes had led to an optimal level of pollution in China. Perhaps 
China’s pollution taxes could be increased to a much higher level to be effective. But even then, 
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the concern is that it could discourage production and lead to more unemployment, causing 
economic and social instability. Addressing environmental degradation while maintaining a stable 
and growing economy thus becomes a paramount task for the Chinese state to engineer a green 
civilization while actualizing the “Chinese dream.” 
However, even if we put external consistency aside, both the environmental Kuznets curve 
argument and the Pigouvian externality argument are problematic in their fundamental 
assumptions and approach. Both share the implicit logic that the environment is like any other 
goods in the economy - we should consume/pollute the environment so long as the marginal 
benefit of polluting outweighs the marginal cost. Both EKC and Pigouvian externality are different 
forms of cost-benefit analyses that assume the superiority of monetary efficiency over 
environmental and social efficiency. Mainstream environmental economics is therefore the 
economics of the environment that subjects the environment to the economy and environmental 
problems to cost-benefit analyses.  
However, its view of the relation between the economy and the environment is an example 
of a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (Daly 1996). Ecological economists have proposed an 
alternative way of viewing the relation between the economy and the environment, which is 
predicated not on the calculation of accounting information (Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, 
Goodland, and Norgaard 1997). Drawing from the laws of thermodynamics, ecological 
economists maintain that the economy is a subsystem of the environment in two fundamental 
ways.  
First, the economy depends on the environment in that it utilizes natural resources of the 
environment as inputs of production. Due to the laws of thermodynamics, the rate of extraction 
and utilization of these resources must be within the environment’s ability to renew them (i.e. the 
environment’s source function) (Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, Goodland, and Norgaard 1997). 
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Furthermore, because the environment is a relatively non-growing system, the scale of economic 
production cannot grow infinitely. It is important to note that ecological economics has 
emphasized the non-substitutability between man-made capital and natural resources (Daly 1996, 
Costanza, Segura, and Martinez-Alier 1996). Advancement of technology, no matter how much it 
is, cannot substitute for natural resources. For instance, if there is no fish to harvest due to 
overfishing, any increase in the technical efficiency of fishing boats is a meaningless endeavor.  
Second, the economy is a sub-system of the environment because economic activity is 
additionally constrained by the sink function of the ecosystem both quantitatively and qualitatively 
(Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, Goodland, and Norgaard 1997). This emphasis recognizes that 
economic production generates wastes that must be transformed into harmless matters. However, 
due to the Entropy Law, the ability of the environment to assimilate and regenerate wastes through 
biogeochemical cycles is neither unlimited nor immune from human degradation. Both the 
quantity (scale effect) and the quality (synergistic, cumulative, and spatial effects) of economic 
activities can damage the sink function of the ecosystem. 
The above view of the relation between the economy and the environment is 
fundamentally different from that of mainstream environmental economics. While mainstream 
environmental economics subject the environment to the economy and environmental issues to 
cost-benefit analyses, ecological economics understands that the economy is constrained by the 
environment’s limited source and sink functions and that a technological transformation in 
consideration of the environment’s biophysical constraints is bound to happen for a sustainable 
economy.  
This is not to entirely discard the prevalent applications of cost-benefit analyses. Cost-
benefit analyses are most frequently used by firms to decide “the inputs they use, the products 
they make, and the methods of production they utilize” to maximize profit in today’s monetary 
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production economy (Forstater 2003). However, the maximization of monetary profits is not 
necessarily consistent with the achievement and the maintenance of a sustainable economy in 
terms of environmental sustainability or, as Keynes focused on, full employment. The optimal 
level of pollution might be economically justifiable in a cost-benefit analysis for firms but not 
environmentally viable/sustainable in consideration of real biophysical limits of the ecosystem.  
Hence, while environmental economics studies the economics of the environment, 
ecological economics studies the environment of the economy. The former assumes the 
superiority of monetary efficiency while the latter understands that money is merely accounting 
information that is worthless in the face of ecological disasters. This critical difference between 
environmental economics and ecological economics inspires different approaches to addressing 
environmental degradation. The Chinese state in recent years has moved away from hoping the 
EKC to self-fulfill to actively addressing environmental issues with synthesized environmental-
industrial policies. This is evidenced by the Chinese state’s prioritizing environmental efficiency 
over monetary efficiency when tackling environmental degradation. One notable example is the 
Chinese state’s “irrational” investment in solar energy, which has been criticized by many 
economists as inefficient and wasteful (Naughton 2018) but celebrated by environmentalists as 
China’s massive state subsidy in the solar industry had contributed to the 80% reduction in the 
cost of solar panels world-wide. In neoclassical terms, these supposedly wasteful and inefficient 
government interventions have in fact enormous positive externalities. 
III. Contradictions in China’s Environmental Policies from 1978 to 2005 
 
Considering China’s alternative political and economic system, the contradictions in 
China’s environmental policies from 1978 to 2005 can be best illustrated via the lens of China’s 
political economy. Between 1949 and 1978, Socialist China devised the country’s first major 
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environmental policy, “Three Rivers and Three Lakes,” 31 in the 1950s to control floods, construct 
hydroelectric power, and address rural and urban water supply (Ross 1998). While the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976 pushed environmental protection into the background, China’s 
State Council started to issue environmental protection laws in 1975, with “half of these statues 
dealt with protecting nature and combating pollution, the rest concerned governmental 
administrative tasks, enforcement procedures, and the responsibilities of scientific research and 
propaganda agencies” (Li 2006). The environmental legislative work continued and, by the 1980s, 
the Chinese state government started to emphasize the importance of sustainable development – 
Chi Xu Fa Zhan – in the context of international environmentalism at the time, which was defined 
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987). Since the 1990s, the state has allocated 
significantly more funding to environmental protection in China. This was especially so during Hu 
Jintao’s tenure of “scientific developmentalism” that saw the state “between 2001 and 2005… 
appropriated 360 billion yuan (US$ 45 billion) primarily for pollution control and prevention, 
[which is] twice as much as the total expenditures for environmental control programs in the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Five-Year Plans (1986-2000) combined” (Li 2006). 
However, despite the above efforts in legislating environmental laws and funding 
environmental protection, China’s environmental policy between 1978 and 2005 remained overall 
ineffective and often contradictory and subsidiary to its economic goals. A notable example is 
China’s Green GDP project, which started in 2004 but was discarded a few years afterwards 
(CAEP 2013). More importantly, China’s environmental laws were becoming comprehensive, but 
the implementation was incomplete; China’s funding for environmental protection was growing 
rapidly, but the scale was still insufficient, and the approach was defensive in nature (Bao 2006; 
 
31 “Three Rivers" refers to the Huai, Hai and Liao Rivers; "Three Lakes" refers to the Tai, Dianchi, and Chao lakes 
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CAEP 2009). Two important causes of the contradictions in China’s environmental policy during 
this period, however, were the Chinese economy’s transformation from an agricultural to an 
industrial economy and the Chinese state’s conscious decision to prioritize economic growth over 
environmental concerns. As one senior NEPA (National Environmental Protection 
Administration) official noted, “Only government regulation can successfully curb environmental 
degradation in a market economy” (Jahiel 1997). 
As elaborated in my first paper on China’s alternative political and economic system, 
China’s post-1978 economic reforms have resulted in the decentralization of the Chinese 
economy, such as the dissolution of the Agricultural Collectives in the countryside and the 
restructuring of the State-Owned-Enterprises in urban China. While adopting a gradualist 
approach to reform, the Chinese state had increasingly granted autonomy to provincial, municipal, 
and local governments, state-owned and private enterprises to decide on economic matters. Deng 
Xiaoqin’s “development is the only hard truth,” therefore, “gave officials at the provincial level 
and below the incentive to develop their local economy, and the wherewithal to do it” (Shirk, 
1993). The consequence is that “most city, county, and township bureaucrats have become 
obsessed with encouraging economic development in their locality, especially as their political 
competency is evaluated based on it” (Li 2006). For example, as Boxer observes, the same 
construction of the thermal and hydroelectric generating plants, water reservoirs, and other 
energy-related systems that spurred China’s economic growth has also caused population 
dislocation, soil erosion, increased deforestation, and a loss of arable land and natural habitats in 
China (Boxer 1989). As another example, the rapid industrialization in China that has led to a rise 
in income and higher levels of food consumption has also resulted in the alarming loss of farm 
land (Smil 1995). 
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Hence, the contradictions in China’s environmental policy reflected “deep contradictions 
that developed in… [China’s] transformation from a traditional agricultural society to a modern 
industrial one and Chinese national rejuvenation in international structure” (Bao 2006). In this 
context, the Chinese state has prioritized economic growth for most of the years after the 1978 
economic reform. This was evidenced by China’s refusal to sign the emissions restrictions 
agreement at the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. As the 
Chinese delegate argued in the convention, “poverty eradication and economy development are 
still the overriding priorities of China,” and that “it is not possible for the Chinese government to 
undertake the obligation of reducing greenhouse gases until the economy develops” (Wan 1998). 
This official stance has led many to predict a rather gloomy environmental future for China, as Li 
wrote, “in light of its vast territory and traditional economic structure, it is unlikely that China will 
adopt strategies that promote ‘clean industries’ to minimize environmental damage.” Li further 
argues as recently as in 2006 that, “it is estimated that China will maintain its focus on heavy 
industries, such as petrochemicals, steel, construction materials, power generation, and coal 
mining, which employ technology that is more wasteful in energy and resources.” It therefore 
appeared that, “the ethos of the reforms and the political economy constructed to support reform 
goals are antithetical to solving China's environmental problems” (Jahiel 1997).  
Not only were environmental concerns less prioritized, from 1978 to 2005, the Chinese 
state has been ineffective at enforcing existing environmental laws due to its overly complex 
institutional arrangement that resulted in bureaucratic fragmentation. The major environmental 
regulatory institutions in China during the 1978-2005 era include: The National People’s Congress 
(as the highest legislative body), the Committee of Environment and Resources, the National 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Committee of Environmental 
Protection in the State Council. As Bao observes, “The various organizations that are responsible 
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for formulating, implementing and supervising environ mental policy have overlapping functions 
and unclear rights and responsibilities” (2006). Additionally, various national ministries and 
committees have their separate environmental bureaus that operate independently from the 
national EPA.  
Not surprisingly, “these bureaus generally follow the regulations of their own ministries 
and committees when the ideas of the national EPA and its own ministries differ” (Bao 2006). 
Furthermore, local environmental protection bureaus are more vertically integrated to their local 
governments (which determine their personnel and allocate their administrative funds) than to the 
national EPA. This means that “when local authorities push for high economic growth and pursue 
administrative goals, local environmental protection bureaus are often unable to implement 
environmental protection policies. In certain cases, some even become accomplices of the 
polluters they are supposed to oversee” (Bao 2006). Institutionally speaking, as long as promotion 
for provincial, municipal, city, and township-level officials is still primarily based upon their ability 
to promote economic growth, implementation of environmental laws at the local levels will 
continue be a major problem for China to address environmental degradation. 
Due to China’s above particularity, conventional policies such as the Pigouvian Taxes as 
informed by the mainstream environmental economics have seen limited application and 
effectiveness in China. First, China’s fee and penalty systems mainly target the larger scale state-
owned enterprises. However, these fees and fines were generally ineffective. They were simply 
augmented to product prices without affecting sales since most of these SOEs were monopolies 
(Bao 2006). Second, the rural township and village enterprises and private enterprises, whose 
competitiveness does depend on low prices, often were able to find ways to evade the fees and 
penalty system. Local governments, in consideration of their political competence (which is 
measured by the locality’s economic performance), had the tendency to “race to the bottom” in 
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order to attract business investments. Third, the discharge fee and fines are far too low to motivate 
enterprises to treat environmental pollution seriously. As Bao argues, “the discharge fee of noise 
is only 0.3 per cent of the cost of product in a levied enterprise. The discharge fee of sewage is 
only 0.03 per cent of gross production and 0.05 per cent of the total cost of a levied enterprise. 
The discharge fee of SO2 for industrial coal is only 0.20 Yuan/kg. These penalties are low especially 
when compared with a growing national economy and the per capita income” (Bao 2006; Xu 
2011). Finally, the levying scope is narrow during this era. For example, only suspended 
particulates and SO2 were levied a fee when it came to the pollution caused by burning coal while 
other pollutants such as CO2 and NO2 were excluded (Bao 2006; Xu 2011). 
In conclusion, despite efforts in legislating environmental laws and funding environmental 
protection, China’s environmental policy between 1978 and 2005 remained overall ineffective and 
often contradictory and subsidiary to its economic goals. These contradictions in China’s 
environmental policy were largely due to China’s transformation from a traditional agricultural 
society to a modern industrial one and the Chinese state’s explicit prioritizing economic growth 
over environmental concerns. During this period, the Chinese state has been ineffective at 
enforcing existing environmental laws due to its complex and fragmented environmental 
bureaucracies and the conflict of interest that existed at the local, municipal, and provincial level. 
Consequently, conventional environmental policies such as the Pigouvian Taxes as informed by 
the mainstream environmental economics had seen limited application and effectiveness in China. 
The question for the Chinese state remains: how to address the apparent contradictions between 
economic growth and environmental protection? How shall a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics engineer a green civilization while elevating the living standards of the 
Chinese people and actualizing the “Chinese dream”? 
IV. From Contradiction to Synthesis Since 2005 
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As discussed above, the contradiction between economic growth and environmental 
sustainability had persisted for most of the years after China’s 1978 economic reform. Since 2005, 
however, the Chinese state has increasingly moved away from hoping the EKC to self-fulfill with 
ad hoc environmental fees and fines to actively addressing environmental degradation with 
systemically designed and implemented environmental-industrial policies and laws. There may be 
many factors that had contributed to the shift of attention of the Chinese state towards 
environmental issues, including the increasing number of environmental protests, the growing 
research that shows the adverse health effects of pollution, the impact of climate change on 
national territory, and the urgency to ensure energy security (Chen, Ebenstein, Greenstone, and 
Li 2013; HEI 2016; Piovani 2017). From the political economy perspective, the shift of attention 
may be another reflection of the reform philosophy of the Chinese state – concentrate on solving 
the most important contradiction first (the contradiction between a low level of economic growth 
and the Chinese people’s desire for a higher standard of living) and then tackle the problems (such 
as environmental degradation and income inequality) that resulted from solving that contradiction. 
Whatever the reason(s) might have been, China’s environmental policy climate since 2005 has 
shifted from contradiction to synthesis that aims to create policy and legal institutions appropriate 
for fostering a green civilization. While it is difficult to present the totality of China’s evolving 
environmental policy climate, I highlight two important undertakings as led by the Chinese state 
after 2005: improving energy efficiency and conservation for today and investing in renewable 
energy for the future. Both point to the Chinese state’s willingness and ability to align monetary 
and environmental efficiencies by synthesized crafting environmental-industrial policies and laws, 
which reflects China’s pursuit of an alternative economic system – a socialist market economy 
with Chinese characteristics. 
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Since 2006, the Chinese state has made substantial investments and regulatory efforts in 
energy efficiency and conservation to balance the need of economic growth and environmental 
sustainability in the short and medium term. Given the trend of China’s increasing energy demands 
in the foreseeable future, investments in energy efficiency and conservation are a transitory 
necessity to a future of renewable energy that is under development. As Zhang argues, “improving 
energy efficiency is considered the cheapest, fastest, and most effective way to keep energy growth 
under control and address environmental concerns” (2013). Considering that industry accounts 
for about 70% of China’s total energy consumption (Zhou, Levine, and Price 2010), it made sense 
for the Chinese state to roll out environmental-industrial policies to “encourage technical progress, 
strengthen pollution control, and to promote industrial upgrading and energy conservation” 
(Zhang 2013). In April 2006, the Chinese state established the “Top 1000 Enterprises Energy 
Conservation Action Program” that covered 1008 enterprises in nine key energy supply and 
consumption industrial subsectors. As Zhang evaluates the program,  
These enterprises each consumed at least 0.18 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) 
in 2004, and all together consumed 47 percent of industrial energy consumption 
in 2004. The program aims to save 100 million tce cumulatively during the period 
2006–10 (NDRC, 2006). While there are areas that need further improvements, 
this program goes very much as planned as far as the energy-saving goal is 
concerned. In September 2011, NDRC reported that the Top-1000 Program had 
estimated to achieve total energy savings of 150 million tce during the 11th five-
year plan period (NDRC, 2011). (2013) 
 
Just as other successful reforms, the Chinese state followed the “experiment, evaluate, and 
expand” approach in this case as well to gradually implement industrial policies to promote energy 
efficiency and conservation. With the lessons learned from and the success of the initial “Top-
1000 Enterprise Program”,  the “NDRC [National Development and Reform Commission] and 
eleven other central government organizations in December 2011 announced the expansion of 
the Top-1000 Program to the 10,000 Program [that]… covered about 17,000 enterprises [that] 
include those industrial and transportation enterprises consuming energy of 0.10 million tce or 
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more and other entities consuming energy of 0.05 million tce in 2010” (NDRC 2012). These 
enterprises cumulatively consumed more than 60% of the national total in 2010, and the program 
aimed to save 250 million tce during the 2011-2015 period. In 2014, the China Electricity Council 
reported that the total energy conservation already reached 309 million tce during the 2011-2014 
period, implying that the 10,000 Enterprise Program exceeded its target by 21.13% one year ahead 
of the schedule. 
In addition to crafting environmental-industrial policies to promote industrial energy 
efficiency and savings, the Chinese state has also tightened residential building efficiency standards 
in a gradualist and pragmatist manner,  
In 1986, the Chinese government issued the energy-saving design standard for 
heating in new residential buildings… This standard was revised in December 
1995, requiring that new buildings be 50 percent more efficient by 2010 and 65 
percent by 2020… [since 2005] China has been enforcing the energy efficiency 
design standard more strictly, requiring that in the very cold area and cold area all 
new buildings in large and middle cities before 2001, in small cities before 2003 
and nationwide since 2006 onwards comply with the energy efficiency standard of 
50 percent (MOHURD 2005). In northern and coastal developed areas, and in 
large cities, all the newly built buildings should meet the requirements of 65 percent 
local building energy efficiency standard (MOHURD, 2005) (Zhang 2013). 
 
Besides regulatory efforts to improve industrial and residential energy conservation, the 
Chinese state has also backed the research, development, and adoption of supercritical (SC) and 
ultra-supercritical (USC) power generation technology to improve energy efficiency in coal-firing 
power plants (Duan 2016). While SC and USC do not make these coal-firing power plants “green”, 
they generate much greater energy efficiency due to greater thermal efficiency compared to other 
cleaner coal technologies. The research, development, and adoption of SC and USC technologies 
as led by the Chinese state thus enabled more economic growth while reducing pollution 
significantly, as evidenced by China’s rapidly falling energy use per unit of real GDP from around 
250 grams of oil equivalent to produce $1 GDP (2011 PPP) in 2005 to roughly 180 grams in 2015 
(which is much closer to the 120-grams OECD average) (Naughton 2018). As Naughton states, 
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There has been a remarkable technological transformation of China’s electricity 
sector: today 44% of [China’s] electricity capacity uses supercritical technology, 
meaning very high temperature (over 705 Fahrenheit), high-pressure generators 
that are significantly more efficient less polluting. This is significantly more 
advanced than the U.S. fleet, which consists predominantly of older subcritical 
plants. For example, China has 90 ultra-supercritical units currently in operation, 
while the United States has precisely one (Hart, Bassett, and Johnson 2017). 
 
It is important to note that the abovementioned investments and regulatory efforts to 
improve energy efficiency and conservation were an integral part of China’s massive and ambitious 
manufacturing upgrading plan – the Supply-Side Structural Reform (SSSR). While the SSSR was 
formally introduced in 2015 by Xi Jinping as a national industrial agenda, many components of it 
were already tested before 2015 that aimed to improve energy efficiency and address pollution. 
These policies included shutting down the especially polluting coal mines, converting the smaller, 
inefficient, and highly polluting coal mines into larger, more efficient, and less polluting ones, and 
reducing excess capacity in heavy industries (especially steel) that are especially environmentally 
damaging (Qi, Stern, Wu, Lu, and Green 2016). With a combination of mandatory closures and 
market incentives, the Chinese state saw that “… by the end of 2010 [from 2005], the total capacity 
of decommissioned smaller and older unites had increased to 76.8 GW (China News Net, 2011), 
almost ten times the total capacity decommissioned during the period 2001–05,” which “led the 
average coal consumed per unit of electricity generated to decline by 12.8 percent by 2012 relative 
to its 2005 levels” (CEC, 2011; CEC and EDF, 2012). 
In addition to these highly coordinated and synthesized environmental-industrial policies 
(which are notably different from the contradictions we observed in the 1978-2005 period), the 
Chinese state has also “increased direct central government pressure on local actors” and created 
legal institutions to help improve energy efficiency and tackle environmental degradation 
(Naughton 2018). On January 1, 2018, the Chinese state implemented a new Environmental 
Protection Tax Law that replaced the previous ineffective pollutant discharge fee system that had 
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been in place for the past 40 years (Shan 2016). While the impacts of the new law remain to be 
seen, some important changes compared to the old system are that the new law is tougher with 
mandatory collection of tax per unit of emissions for air, water, and solid wastes and that it aims 
to increase enforcement by allowing all revenue collected to stay at the local level (Shan 2016).  
Meanwhile, in the transport sector, the Chinese state adjusted the excise tax for vehicles 
several times over the years to incentivize the purchase of energy-efficient cars. In addition to the 
substantial subsidies granted to EVs (Electric Vehicles), the Chinese state had “… from September 
1, 2008, the rate for small cars with engines of 1.0 liter or less further decreased [from 3 percent 
in 1994] to 1 percent, whereas the rate for cars with engines of no less than 3 liters but no larger 
than 4 liters was set at 25 percent… Cars with engines of larger than 4 liters were taxed at the 
highest rate of 40 percent” (Zhang 2010). The result is that “China has set even more stringent 
fuel economy standards for its rapidly growing passenger vehicle fleet than those in Australia, 
Canada, California and the US, although they are less stringent than those in Japan and the EU. 
In the meantime, expanding Chinese cities are prioritizing public transport and are promoting 
efficient public transport systems” (Zhang 2010). 
Above I have demonstrated the synthesis in China’s post-2005 environmental-industrial 
policies and laws in improving energy efficiency and conservation. These synthesized 
environmental-industrial policies included the Top-1000 Enterprises Program, the expanded Top-
10,000 Enterprises Program, the more stringent residential design standards, the investments in 
SC and USC technologies, the Supply-Side Structural Reform, and the implementation of the new 
Environmental Protection Tax, etc. However, while improving energy efficiency and conservation 
is important and worthy, it does not alter the fact that China today is still heavily dependent on 
coal as the country relies on coal-burning for 2/3 of its electricity generation as of 2018. Hence, 
these policies, while effective, should be regarded as transitory solutions in the near term to balance 
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China’s needs for energy security, economic development, and environmental sustainability. To 
investigate China’s environmental future, I now examine the Chinese state’s developmental role 
in the research and development of renewable energy. 
Like implementing synthesized environmental-industrial policies to improve energy 
efficiency and conservation, since 2005 the Chinese state has positioned the renewable energy 
sector at the core of its national industrial planning and saw tremendous success. I first briefly 
discuss the results of China’s renewable energy development in recent years as well as the ways by 
which the Chinese state has promoted that development. I then address the more important and 
nuanced question – is the political will of the Chinese state to continue its unparallel commitment 
in renewable energy sustainable? The answer to this question is critical to predicting China’s (and, 
to great extent, the world’s) renewable energy and environmental trend. 
China’s success in renewable energy development has been well documented. When China 
passed its Renewable Energy Law in 2005, it had 112 gigawatts (GW) of installed hydroelectric 
capacity but almost no wind, solar, or biomass power (IRENA 2019). By 2018, China had 323 
GW of installed hydroelectric capacity, ranking first in the world and more than tripling the second 
highest Brazil’s (IRENA 2019). China’s nonexistent wind energy in 2005 reached 185 GW of 
installed capacity in 2018, ranking first in the world and almost doubling the second highest U.S.’s 
at 94 GW (IRENA 2019). In terms of solar, China reached 175 GW installed capacity in 2018, 
ranking first in the world and more than tripling Japan’s 56 GW and the U.S.’s 51 GW (IRENA 
2019). Finally, in terms of total installed capacity of renewable energy sources, which include wind, 
solar, biomass, geothermal, hydropower, and marine energy, China had reached 695 GW as of 
2018, more than doubling the second highest U.S.’s 245 GW (IRENA 2019), as shown in figure 
1. 
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China’s renewable energy development has effectively curbed the country’s reliance on 
coal (see Figures 2 – 6). Kennedy (2013) observed that, “… renewable and nuclear power 
accounted for 94% of the growth in Chinese electricity generation in 2012. As a result, China met 
more than 9% of its primary energy demand from non-fossil sources that year…” In recent years, 
while coal and other fossil fuels still represent China’s bulk of energy sources, their weight seemed 
to have plateaued while that of the renewable energy has climbed. This has led to CNREC (China 
National Renewable Energy Center) to project that, “China will not require gas as a bridge between 
coal and renewable energy” and that “the deployment of solar and wind power can increase 
significantly in the next 10 years… and become the core of the nation’s energy system by 2050” 
(CNREC 2018). 
The ways by which the Chinese state has promoted the above development of renewable 
energy in China are well-documented, too. As Gallagher (2013) summarized,  
Most of China's environmental policies are implemented to achieve targets set by 
the central government in its five-year plans. In the 12th Five Year Plan, for the 
period 2011 to 2015, the government set ambitious targets for renewables… the 
central government enacts some national-level policies and then assigns partial 
responsibility to provinces and municipalities to achieve the target… China's 
support for renewable energy was greatly enhanced in 2005 with passage of ‘The 
Renewable Energy Law of the People's Republic of China.’ The law created four 
mechanisms to promote renewable energy: (1) a national renewable energy target; 
(2) a mandatory connection and purchase policy; (3) a feed-in tariff system; and (4) 
a cost-sharing mechanism, including a fund for renewable energy development…” 
 
It is important to note that Gallagher’s observation of China’s renewable energy 
development raises a critical question: given that China’s advancement in renewable energy has 
largely been dependent on the vision of the Chinese state, could it sustain? In other words, is it 
possible that the Chinese state in the foreseeable future might change its stance on renewable 
energy and revert the country’s energy usage back to fossil fuels? After all, China’s economic 
development since 1949 has confirmed the dominant, evolving, and developmental role of the 
Chinese state in shaping economic and social processes. The Chinese state’s vision is thus of 
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paramount importance for us to predict China’s future of renewable energy and environmental 
sustainability. 
Though there may be setbacks (such as the ongoing U.S.-China trade war that saw 
President Trump increasing tariffs on Made-in-China solar panels), I argue that it is unlikely that 
the Chinese state will revert its strong commitment in renewable energy. I argue that there are 
three structural causes, in addition to the commonly understood ones (such as the heavy health 
costs associated with environment pollution), that motivate the Chinese state to continue pursuing 
renewable energy development. First, from the standpoint of energy security and independence, 
China’s main nonrenewable endowment is coal. However, “China's reserve-to-production ratio is 
only thirty-three years, indicating that China either needs to find alternatives to coal or bear the 
energy-security risks of becoming a massive coal importer… China has poor remaining 
endowments of oil and gas, quickly becoming a major importer of both. China is now the second 
largest oil importer in the world after the United States” (Gallagher 2011). Hence, China’s resource 
curse may be a blessing in disguise as it mandates the Chinese state to develop renewable energy 
(which the country is much better endowed with) as a long-term solution to its energy security 
and independence while expanding foreign energy imports and investing in foreign energy 
production in the short run. 
The second structural cause concerns with the structural change of the Chinese economy 
and the need for the Chinese state to find new sources of economic growth as a result. Concerning 
the structural change of the Chinese economy and its impact on the environment, Naughton states 
the following,  
1. Slower economic growth: The simple fact of [China’s] slower GDP growth 
[from double digit to around 6% in 2019] means that fewer emissions and 
pollutants are being released. 2. Lower investments: As growth slows, China will 
gradually invest a smaller share of its GDP in new fixed capital… This reduces the 
demand for energy-intensive industrial goods such as steel and cement. 3. Shift to 
services: As industrial output reaches peak levels, the growth impetus shifts to 
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services… Most services are far less energy intensive and polluting than industry 
(2018). 
 
While Naughton’s assessment may have been overly simplified, it does point out an 
important reason for the Chinese state to double down on renewable energy development: to find 
new sources of economic growth 32 . Hence, the Chinese state’s renewable energy policy has 
demonstrated an interesting reversal of the logic of the Environmental Kuznets Curve – instead 
of sacrificing the environment for economic growth, let us use renewable energy development as 
a vehicle to drive economic growth. As Gallagher describes this synthesis in China’s economic 
and environmental policymaking (2013), 
In an April 2012 speech, China's Premier Wen Jiabao said, ‘Greening of the 
economy is not a burden on growth; rather, it is an engine that drive growth and 
an effective means to achieve sustainable development.’ As of 2011, four of the 
ten largest manufacturers of wind turbines were Chinese companies. Similarly, five 
of the top ten manufacturers of solar PV cells were headquartered in China. 
China's wind power industry (power generation and turbine manufacturing) 
generated an average of 40,000 direct jobs annually between 2006 and 2010 and is 
expected to generate 34,000 jobs annually between 2011 and 2020. China's 
renewable energy industry has reached a scale large enough to contribute directly 
to global price reductions, further incentivizing domestic deployment of renewable 
energy. 
 
The third structural cause that motivates the Chinese state to maintain and strengthen its 
commitment in renewable energy development is the country’s search for “indigenous 
innovation” (or, as Kennedy (2013) puts it, “techno-nationalism”33) and an early competitive edge 
in global strategic industries. In 2006, after several years of deliberation, the Chinese state unveiled 
the MLP (National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development 
2006-2020) to push for “indigenous innovation” and technology independence for China. As the 
 
32 It should be noted that as China’s economic base enlarges, it is expected that its growth rate would decelerate. In 
some ways, 6% may still be considered too high since, in comparison, India has a GDP growth rate of roughly 4.5% 
in 2019 while having a much smaller economic base (roughly 20% of China’s). 
33 Adam Segal and David Kang described “techno-nationalism” as “the desire of Asian states to free themselves 
from dependence on western technologies.” 
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report explains the urgency for indigenous innovation, “China’s overall S&T level still has a fairly 
big gap to close, compared with that of developed nations… the nation will be for a long period 
of time under enormous pressures from developed nations [that] possess economic and S&T 
superiority… Facts have proved that, in areas critical to the national economy and security, core 
technologies cannot be purchased…” (MLP 2006). Fourteen years have passed since the release 
of the MLP. The rising global climate of isolationism, nationalism, populism, and protectionism 
since then seems to have validated the Chinese state’s push for indigenous innovation that 
included the development of renewable energy (Lau 2018). 
Specifically, the MLP listed eleven priorities that were regarded as “critical to economic 
and social development and national security and in dire need of science and technology” (MLP 
2006). Among these priorities, developing new energy technologies was listed first and foremost. 
Then, in 2010, the Chinese state rolled out a more focused plan to accelerate the development of 
seven ‘‘Strategic Emerging Industries’’ (SEI) in which renewable energy again occupied a strategic 
position. The SEI included the development of solar, wind, hydropower, nuclear, and electric 
vehicles, among others (Chang and Bruyninckx 2011). Since the goals of the MLP and the SEI 
were to push for indigenous innovation and to develop competitive advantages through early 
actions in global strategic industries, being part of both the MLP and the SEI entailed significant 
boon for China’s renewable energy sector. Preferential policies were devised, such as that “China’s 
electricity grid is obligated to purchase all the electricity generated by approved renewable energy 
facilities located in its service area” and that “the price for renewable energy will be set by the 
NDRC” (CEC 2017). Note that both policies were considered unconventional practices that 
distort the energy market by mainstream economists. 
In conclusion, China’s environmental policy climate since 2005 has generally shifted from 
contradiction to synthesis. The Chinese state has created policy and legal institutions appropriate 
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for fostering a green civilization. I examined two important undertakings as led by the Chinese 
state since 2005: improving energy efficiency and conservation for today and investing in 
renewable energy for the future. I also argued that the Chinese state’s determination to develop 
renewable energy and to guide the Chinese economy onto a sustainable path is likely to strengthen 
due to the abovementioned structural causes.  
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I examined China’s environmental reality and the evolution of China’s 
environmental policy after the country’s 1978 economic reform. I first surveyed China’s dual 
economic and environmental crises. I then evaluated the debate between mainstream 
environmental economics and heterodox ecological economics regarding the relationship between 
the economy and the environment and the extent to which it is applicable to China. I then 
examined China’s era of contradictory environmental policy and ineffective environmental 
governance from 1978 to 2005. Finally, I delineated the evolution of China’s environmental policy 
since 2005. I concluded that in attempting to build an ecological civilization, the Chinese state’s 
environmental policies have largely evolved from contradiction to synthesis in recent years. 
Furthermore, such trend should continue. 
This paper, as the second part of my dissertation, complements my first essay on China’s 
alternative economic system, which was defined by the dominant, evolving, and developmental 
role of the Chinese state in economic and social processes. In this paper, I have demonstrated that 
China’s socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics also has bearings in determining 
China’s environmental processes. While there may be short-term setbacks and fluctuations, I 
remain cautiously optimistic that China will succeed in replacing most of the coal use with 
renewable energy by 2050 (CNREC 2018) and building an ecological civilization. 
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Finally, while it is difficult to present the totality of China’s environmental policy climate, 
I hope to demonstrate to readers that China’s environmental policy today is in a historically 
stronger political and institutional position to take advantage of creative public policies to engineer 
environmental sustainability while achieving economic growth and full employment. One such 
policy could be a Green Job Guarantee program, which I investigate in the third essay of my 
dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Total Installed Renewable Energy Capacity 
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Figure 4.  China’s Coal Consumption by Sector 1990-2017 
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Figure 5.  China’s Renewable Electricity Generation by Source 1990-2017 
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Figure 6.  Total Non-Hydro Renewable Electricity Net Generation 1980-2015 
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Figure 7.  Primary Coal Production, China, 1980-2017 
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Figure 8.  Primary Coal Consumption, China, 1980-2017 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
GREEN JOB GUARANTEE FOR CHINA—FROM FULL EMPLOYMENT TO  
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Introduction 
 
The primary purpose and contribution of this essay is to propose a tailored Green Job 
Guarantee program (thereafter Green JG) for the Chinese economy to coordinate economic 
growth, employment, structural adjustments, and environmental sustainability. I first demonstrate 
that a Job Guarantee program is far more effective in creating jobs than the conventional 
macroeconomic policies that indirectly create jobs by stimulating economic growth. I then explain 
why China would especially benefit from a Green JG and why China’s time to implement it is ripe. 
Afterwards, I show that a Chinese Green JG is affordable. Increasing China’s fiscal deficit by 
1.58% of 2019 GDP would have financed a complete Chinese Green JG to eliminate China’s the 
24.27 million urban individuals currently unemployment and elevate China’s GDP growth rate to 
the 9.23% and 10.65% range in 2019. Combined with the many other benefits of a green and fully 
employed economy, such as economic, social, and political stabilities and environmental 
sustainability, a Chinese Green JG is well worth it. Moreover, since a Green JG entails increased 
deficit spending, I examine the sustainability and functionality of Chinese government deficits 
(and government deficits in general) by constructing and examining sector balances for three 
representative countries – China, the U.S., and Greece. My conclusion is that China’s deficit 
spending to finance the Green JG is not only sustainable but also functional. Finally, I explore the 
design of a Chinese Green JG, such as how it should be administered, what jobs it could create, 
and why China should adopt a gradualist approach in order to implement it. 
I divide the essay into five sections. Section I introduces what a Job Guarantee is. I explain 
its advantages against the conventional tools of addressing unemployment. Section II explains why 
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China would especially benefit from a Green JG. I investigate four major changes and challenges 
that have pressured China’s economic growth and employment in recent years. I then show how 
a Chinese Green JG promotes China’s economic growth and full employment while enhancing 
the Chinese state’s ability to tackle each of these four changes and challenges. In section III, I 
explain why China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe. In section IV, I estimate the economic 
benefits and costs of a full-fledged Chinse Green JG. In section V, I inquire into the sustainability 
and functionality of China’s deficit spending. In section VI, I discuss the design of a Chinese 
Green JG and summarize my key findings in the conclusion section. 
I.  What is a Job Guarantee 
 
A Job Guarantee (JG) or Employer of Last Resort (ELR) is a publicly funded and locally 
administered employment program to 1) eliminate unemployment in a market economy by 
offering a job to anyone willing, able, and ready to work and 2) achieve public purposes by creating 
these jobs in appropriate fields (such as infrastructure, environmental service, and cultural heritage 
programs, etc.). It is a different public policy approach advocated by many to address 
unemployment (Minsky 1986, Forstater 2003, Wray 2004, Fullwiler 2005, and Kaboub 2007, etc.). 
Conventional macroeconomic policies – fiscal and monetary – aim to indirectly create jobs by 
stimulating economic growth. The problem, however, is that labor-displacing technical change 
(i.e. the machine process, robotics, and automation) is a structural trend that continues to 
undermine the causality from economic growth to job growth.34 The result is that economic 
stimulus policies generate jobless growth (Ricardo 1911, Forstater 2000). In comparison, a JG 
offers an unorthodox but logical solution to unemployment: eliminate joblessness by directly 
creating jobs. Then, these new jobs not only achieve public purposes (such as reforestation to 
 
34 Some argue that historically we have seen manufacturing jobs replacing agricultural jobs and service jobs replacing 
manufacturing jobs. The problem, however, is that services jobs are now themselves being lost to the machine process, 
which begs the question, “where do we go from now?” 
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address desertification) but also contribute to the growth of the market economy as the JG 
workers’ wages translate into consumer spending, business sales, revenue, profits, and 
investments. Hence, while conventional economic stimulus policies indirectly create jobs by 
promoting economic growth, a JG program creates jobs first, which then organically generates 
economic growth. 
The above logical difference between conventional macroeconomic policies and the Job 
Guarantee program has important implications regarding the quantitative relationship between 
China’s GDP growth rate and unemployment rate. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was clear when 
he discussed the purpose of China’s economic growth, “the reason we care about GDP is because 
we care about employment stability” (Li 2013). However, his calculations expressed concerns 
about the effectiveness of stimulating GDP growth to create jobs, as he said in 2013, “In the past, 
each one percent of China’s GDP growth can create employment opportunities for 1 million 
Chinese. With the economy’s structural adjustments, especially with the accelerating growth of the 
service sector, now [in 2013] each one percentage of China’s GDP growth can create 1.3 or even 
1.5 million jobs” (Li 2013). This means that even if we assume that 1% GDP growth generates 
1.5 million more jobs, China’s GDP would have needed to grow for an additional 16% to eliminate 
its 24 million urban unemployment figure in 2019. This unrealistic requirement precisely 
demonstrates the difficulty of translating GDP growth to job growth using conventional economic 
stimulus policies in a world that is increasingly automated and capital-intensive. 
If, however, we aim to create jobs directly and let economic growth become a residual, my 
calculation in section IV shows that a complete Chinese Green JG (assuming an average JG wage 
of 3700 RMB per month) will eliminate China’s 24.27 million urban unemployment while 
generating an additional 3.13% to 4.55% GDP growth in 2019. This means that to employ the 
same 24 million urban people currently unemployed in China in 2019, a JG approach now 
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“requires”35 the GDP to grow for only 3.13% - 4.55% more, as opposed to the 16% more as 
calculated before. The discrepancy reflects the fundamental advantage a JG program has over 
conventional macroeconomic stimulus policies – conventional economic stimulus policies only 
indirectly create jobs by promoting economic growth whereas a JG program creates jobs first, 
which then organically generates economic growth. Hence, echoing the importance of stabilizing 
employment, a JG approach is undoubtedly the more viable choice for China. In a nutshell, the 
“job growth creates GDP growth” is functional whereas the “GDP growth creates job growth” is 
inefficient and often contradictory to environmental and structural adjustments goals. 
Not only are conventional macroeconomic policies ineffective at promoting employment, 
so are the conventional tools of education and training/retraining. Keynes’s principle of effective 
demand argues that unemployment is a structural defect in a capitalist market economy because 
the firms’ profit-maximizing level of output generally does not coincide with the full employment 
level of output (Keynes 1936). This means that though training and education are important, they 
cannot alone explain aggregate unemployment. An individual’s hard work, education, and training 
may lead him/her to a job. But that only changes the composition of unemployment without 
altering joblessness in the aggregate level. As Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsay explain Harvey’s 
(2001) parable of dogs and bones: 
Suppose there are 100 dogs on an island.  Every day a plane flies over and 
drops 95 bones on the island.  At least five dogs will be boneless, and perhaps 
more, as it is possible that some dogs could get more than one bone.  We say the 
boneless dogs do not have enough motivation or have underdeveloped muscles or 
in other ways lack ability as bone gatherers.  We take the boneless dogs aside and 
train them and put them through various exercises to improve their abilities.  The 
next time the plane flies over and drops 95 bones, some of those who received 
training may obtain a bone.  But as long as we do not increase the total number of 
bones, at least five dogs will remain boneless.  Training and education and other 
human capital traits may, in part, determine which workers will get jobs and which 
will not, but for everyone to find employment we need to increase the aggregate 
 
35 “Require” may not be the precise word, since GDP growth is a consequence of job creation in a JG, not a cause 
as in conventional economic tools. 
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number of positions. Full employment requires that there are at least as many job 
vacancies as people needing work (Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsay 2015) 
 
Hence, the Job Guarantee is an innovative policy response to the failures of conventional 
macroeconomic policies and education and training programs in achieving and maintaining full 
employment in a market economy. 
Another important advantage of a JG program, when compared to conventional 
macroeconomic policies, is that it reduces policy instability and uncertainty. This is because a JG 
program is an institutionalized countercyclical automatic stabilizer to manage the macroeconomy. 
When the market economy slows down, the market sector (including both privately-owned 
businesses and the State-owned Enterprises) will release workers into the JG program to produce 
more publicly desirable goods (such as environmental service, cultural heritage preservation 
programs, and other quality-of-life enhancing works). When the market economy expands, 
workers will be incentivized by the higher wages offered by the private sector to re-enter market 
employment and produce more market goods. A JG program thus complements the market, 
rather than replacing it. A JG program therefore not only achieves full employment at a point in 
time but also maintains full employment through time (Forstater 2000). Employment fluctuations 
during the business cycles are shown as below36: 
 
36 Figure taken from “The Cost of Unemployment and the Job Guarantee Alternative in Saudi Arabia,” by Mathew 
Forstater, Fadhel Kaboub, and Michael Kelsay in 2015. 
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Figure 9.  The Job Guarantee Approach to Unemployment 
 
Moreover, JG programs are generally affordable, especially for countries with monetary 
sovereignty. Numerous researches have demonstrated the financial affordability of a JG for a 
variety of countries, including the U.S., Australia, Tunisia, India, Saudi Arabia, and even Greece 
(Mitchell and Watts 1997, Gordon 1997, Kitson, Michie, and Sutherland 1997, Fullwiler 2003, 
Kaboub 2007, Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsey 2015). In this paper, I demonstrate that even the 
most conservative estimates of the benefits of a Chinese Green JG by far outweigh the costs of 
implement it. I also show that the fiscal deficit needed to finance a Chinese Green JG is not only 
sustainable but also functional to stabilize Chinese private sector balance sheets. 
Note that the benefits of a JG are enormous precisely due to the tremendous economic 
and social costs of unemployment for the macroeconomy, individuals, households, communities, 
and the nation state. Macroeconomically, unemployment entails a loss of potential GDP should 
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the unemployed were hired to contribute to production. Individually, unemployment presents 
substantial economic and psychological hardship that threatens one’s material provisioning and 
mental health. Socially, unemployment is discouraging and detrimental to cultivate social trust and 
harmony. For the nation state, unemployment generates social and political instabilities that could 
result in populism37.  
A final introductory note about the JG concerns with its applications in the real world. 
While a variety of countries (such as the United States, Sweden, Australia, Argentina, and India, 
etc.) have experimented JG in some forms, the design and implementation of their job creation 
programs have been partial and incomplete. Even when a program was clearly functioning well, it 
could still be discontinued, as evidenced by the American New Deal after WWII. The most 
important factors that have constrained the development of JG worldwide are not economical but 
rather political and ideological. This is because even though JG is complementary to market 
economy, it is a socialist public policy in nature that entails changes that may undermine the power 
position of the capitalists. As such, it faces strong political and ideological oppositions in countries 
that follow the path of a capitalist market economy that promotes laissez-faire ideologically. 
Kalecki, for instance, was skeptical that the economically possible (i.e. full employment) could be 
maintained due to the politically undesirable in a capitalist society. He notes that a full employment 
capitalism entails essential social and institutional changes, 
‘Full employment capitalism’ will, of course, have to develop new social and 
political institutions which will reflect the increased power of the working class. If 
capitalism can adjust itself to full employment, a fundamental reform will have 
been incorporated in it. If not, it will show itself an outmoded system which must 
be scrapped (Kalecki 1943). 
 
Hence, various forms of JG have only been adopted in these countries when 
unemployment issues became too acute. China, on the other hand, is in a unique position to use 
 
37 As seen in the U.S., Taiwan, and Hong Kong, etc. in recent years. 
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JG as a mean to an end due to the Chinese state’s pragmatic and developmental role in shaping 
China’s socialist market economy, as I elaborated in chapter two. 
In this section, I have introduced what a Job Guarantee is. The main takeaways are as 
follows. First, conventional macroeconomic policies are inefficient at creating jobs by stimulating 
economic growth, due to labor-displacing technical change. Job Guarantee, on the other hand, is 
more effective in stabilizing employment because it directly creates jobs, which then organically 
promotes economic growth. Second, JG reduces policy instability because it is a countercyclical 
macroeconomic stabilizer that automatically expands during economic downturns and contracts 
during economic booms. Third, JG complements, rather than replaces, the market economy. 
II.  Why China Needs a Green JG 
 
Besides the already mentioned benefits of a JG in the previous section, I argue that China 
would especially benefit from a Green JG because it has the potential to help the Chinese economy 
coordinate economic growth, employment, structural adjustments, and environmental 
sustainability. I first identify four major changes and challenges that have pressured China’s 
economic growth and employment in recent years. I then show how a Chinese Green JG promotes 
China’s economic growth and full employment while enhancing the Chinese state’s ability to tackle 
each of these four changes and challenges. 
The Job Guarantee component of a Green JG addresses China’s economic growth and 
employment concerns that have resulted from the several changes and challenges in recent years. 
These changes and challenges are domestic, international, structural, and technical. Domestically, 
the Supply-Side Structural Reform38 (SSSR), while necessary to reduce excessive capacity, address 
pollution, and upgrade China’s industry, inevitably put downward pressure on the Chinese 
economy in the short and medium term. Internationally, Trump’s initiation of the trade war against 
 
38 The SSSR was officially announced by President Xi in late 2015. 
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China in 2018 (which has been accompanied with technology war, currency war, and media war, 
etc.) has pressured China’s economic growth through the exports channel. Structurally, China’s 
population growth slowdown due to urbanization presents a serious long-term challenge for the 
Chinese economy to transition from export-led to domestic consumption-led. Finally, in the 
technical dimension, the Chinese state’s macroeconomic policy in the last few years had preferred 
corporate tax cuts and monetary policies to direct government spending, which reduced the 
effectiveness of budget deficits.39 
I argue that the Job Guarantee component of my Green JG proposal effectively addresses 
China’s economic growth and employment concerns while enhancing the Chinese state’s ability 
to tackle each of these changes and challenges. First, the JG program not only supports the SSSR 
by creating employment opportunities to counteract the unemployment pressure from reducing 
excess capacity. It also enriches the SSSR by increasing shortage capacity (such as the Chinese 
economy’s ability to perform environmental service, preserve and disseminate Chinese traditional 
culture, and other quality-of-life-enhancing works). This is because the types of jobs created 
through the JG depend on the need of the Chinese economy. Therefore, a Chinese Green JG 
program does not create excess capacity; rather, it targets areas of the Chinese economy that have 
been neglected by the market. A Chinese Green JG program thus enables China’s Supply-Side 
Structural Reform by stabilizing employment and enriches it by increasing needed capacity of the 
Chinese economy. 
Second, my proposed JG program supports the Chinese economy’s structural transition 
from export-led to domestic consumption-led. As Trump’s trade war against China in the context 
of global populism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism signals a “new normal,” the 
 
39 However, there has been a reversal in 2019 and 2020, as infrastructure investment was reinvigorated under Li 
Keqiang’s leadership. 
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Chinese economy must develop its resilience against external demand shocks by promoting its 
domestic demand (China State Council 2018). A JG program can facilitate this process through 
increasing the purchasing power of the previously unemployed Chinese workers (who have a 
greater marginal propensity to consume).40 As the JG program creates employment, it increases 
workers’ disposable income, thereby increasing workers’ consumption and stabilizing firms’ 
profits and balance sheets. Hence, the JG program begins with creating public sector employment 
to achieve public purposes and ends by stimulating the market economy to promote economic 
growth. 
Third, a JG program alleviates macroeconomic pressure arising from China’s slowdown 
in population growth rate. The decline in China’s population growth rate entails two 
macroeconomic issues. First, China’s labor supply growth will decelerate, which implies that cheap 
labor cannot be a long-term strategy to secure international competitiveness for Chinese 
manufacturing. Second, China’s domestic demand will be harder to manage since the unborn 
Chinese people would not buy goods and services. A JG program helps addresses both issues. By 
offering a job to any Chinese willing, able, and ready to work, a JG allows the Chinese economy 
to operate at full utilization of labor at a point in time. By guaranteeing employment, a JG program 
also brings economic security to Chinese households that should positively impact China’s 
population growth rate, thereby increasing China’s labor supply over time. In terms of its impact 
on domestic demand, a JG program stabilizes domestic consumption by paying wages to the 
previously unemployed workers. These news wages translate into consumption more effectively, 
since JG workers tend to exhibit much higher marginal propensity to consume than high-income 
earners. 
 
40 Keynes in the General Theory argues that lower-income workers spend a larger proportion of additional income 
on consumption and therefore have a greater marginal propensity of consume. 
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Fourth, I mentioned before that the Chinese state’s macroeconomic policy in the last few 
years had preferred tax cuts and monetary policies to direct government spending, which reduced 
the effectiveness of budget deficits. A JG program can be much more economically simulative 
even with the same amount of impact on fiscal budget. For instance, a one million RMB personal 
income tax cut for Ma Yun41 produces limited macroeconomic simulative effects since Ma Yun’s 
consumption habit will hardly be affected by the additional income. Similarly, a one million RMB 
corporate tax cut does little to stimulate the economy when the corporation uses the money not 
to invest but to buy back its stock in the financial market. However, a one million RMB wage in 
the hands of the Chinese JG workers will likely translate most (if not all) of that amount into 
consumption (and most likely consumption of domestically produced goods and services), thereby 
stimulating economic growth via the multiplier effect. Both tax cuts and JG spending in my 
example have the same impact on fiscal budget. Yet, they produce drastically different simulative 
and distributional effects. 
It is also important to note that the JG program does not compete with the private sector 
in the end market since they produce different goods and services. The JG program does, however, 
compete with the private sector in the input market for workers. This allows the JG to ensure the 
basic benefits of workers – since a worker can always earn a living wage in the JG program if being 
mistreated by the private employer. The JG wage thus effectively becomes the minimum wage. 
However, the JG wage needs to be appropriate – high enough to be a living wage and low enough 
to not cause wage-led inflation or impair private employers’ ability to hire. If the JG wage rate is 
set too high, exporting industries could see their international competitiveness undermined due to 
increased labor costs. Considering the Chinese state’s vision to maintain China’s industrial 
 
41 Founder of Alibaba, the largest e-commerce company in China by revenue. 
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dominance, I use 3700 RMB42 as an average JG worker’s monthly income to estimate the cost of 
a Chinese Green JG in section IV. 
Another reason that China would especially benefit from a Green JG results from the 
strategic role of the Chinese SOEs in the Chinese economy. A JG program should be considered 
a more desirable solution to address unemployment and economic deceleration than having the 
State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) to expand hiring and investments when there are no market 
demands.43 A Chinese JG program thus allows the Chinese SOEs to focus on their industrial 
strategies, improve operational efficiency, and thereby expand international competitiveness. This, 
of course, does not mean that a JG program will or should take away the many other important 
responsibilities shouldered by the SOEs, such as investments in R&D. 
Nevertheless, above I have shown that a well-designed Chinese JG program can effectively 
address China’s economic growth and employment concerns while complementing the Chinese 
state’s goals in implementing the SSSR, countering trade wars and international protectionism, 
coping with the slowdown in population growth, transitioning to a domestic consumption-led 
economy, and increasing the effectiveness of fiscal deficits. A JG program thus especially benefits 
China in terms of balancing China’s economic growth, employment, and structural adjustments – 
three macroeconomic goals elaborated by Premier Li Keqiang (Li 2019). Since a JG program can 
be designed to fulfill environmental goals, I propose a Chinese Green JG as a synthesized 
economic-environmental policy to help China coordinate economic growth, employment, 
structural adjustments, and environmental sustainability. 
III.  Why China’s Time to Implement a Green JG is Ripe 
 
 
42 3700 RMB per month is selected because it is the average wage for the Chinese peasant-workers in 2018. The 
2019 figure is not yet available. 
43 Such as during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, many Chinese SOEs were directed to scale up production despite 
making a loss at the time in order to stabilize employment. 
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I have demonstrated in the previous section that China would especially benefit from a 
Green JG program. Whether it is to counteract the unemployment pressure from structural 
adjustments, to cope with the U.S.-China trade war in an increasingly conflictual international 
political climate, to better transition the Chinese economy from export-led to domestic 
consumption-led in the context of declining population growth, or to promote economic growth 
without sacrificing the environment, a Green JG program is an effective policy tool. These are the 
demand-side reasons for why China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe. In this section, I explain 
the supply-side reasons – why China is ready and capable to implement a Green JG. 
First, from the political economy perspective, a Green JG can be an important component 
of the “Chinese Characteristics” of China’s socialist market economy. As I concluded in my essay, 
Transformation, not Transition: A Critical Survey of China’s Political Economy, in order to understand the 
future of the Chinese economy, the question to ask is not whether China should have the market 
or not, or whether the Chinese state is interfering too much, but rather what kind of a market 
economy best fulfills the developmental vision set by the Chinese state. Following Deng 
Xiaoping’s “black cat, white cat” principle, a market economy is simply a tool, not an end for the 
Chinese state. Hence, compared with capitalist market economies, China faces no significant 
political and ideological barriers to adopt a socialist labor policy.44 
By definition, a Job Guarantee program creates employment opportunities for those who 
are left behind by the market economy. Hence, it complements the market economy as opposed 
to replacing it. This is consistent with the Chinese state’s two primary visions for its economy that 
I elaborated in my first essay: a continuous determination to the market economy and a continuous 
search for and expansion of the Chinese characteristics of that market economy. A full-
 
44 Bernie Sanders included a new “New Deal” as his core economic policy when he ran for the U.S. presidency in 
2016. Many criticized this policy for being too socialist. 
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employment market economy is therefore a concrete reflection of China’s socialist market 
economy. As it becomes increasingly clear that China’s political economy ushers a different yet 
viable political and economic order that challenges the Western liberal democracy and free market 
ideals, China is in a stronger political and institutional position to implement the Green JG.  
Furthermore, while President Xi’s “confidence doctrine”45 enables the implementation of 
a socialist labor market policy like a Green JG, the “confidence doctrine” itself can be strengthened 
and enriched by the Green JG. This reason is simple: if the Chinese state successfully implements 
a Green JG to eliminate unemployment (which, as Keynes argues, is a persistent structural 
problem of the market economy), it would truly be enriching the meaning of China’s “socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics.” A full employment socialist market economy has 
every reason to be confident in its “path, theory, system, and culture” (Xi 2017). 
Second, China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe because, as I elaborated in chapter 
three, China’s environmental policy climate today seeks synthesized environmental-economic 
policies to address the contradiction between economic growth and environmental sustainability. 
Like implementing synthesized environmental-industrial policies and laws to improve energy 
efficiency and conservation, the Chinese state since 2005 has also positioned the renewable energy 
sector at the core of its national industrial planning to ensure energy security for the future. 
Though it is not always possible to align monetary efficiency and environmental efficiency, there 
exists substantial synthesis between economic growth and environmental sustainability. For 
example, as Chen estimates, “spending within three segments of the renewable energy sectors – 
solar, wind and bioenergy will produce in combination about twice as many jobs per dollar of 
expenditure than an equal amount of spending on fossil fuels [in China]” (Chen 2018). 
 
45 The four confidences include: confidence in path, confidence in system, confidence in theories, and confidence in 
culture.  
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Considering this positive development in China’s environmental policy climate in recent 
years, the time for China to implement a Green JG is ripe. This is because a Green JG can 
contribute to environmental sustainability in two primary ways. As Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsay 
state, 
There are two main ways in which the JG program can promote ecological 
sustainability.  First, JG workers can be directly employed in activities that enhance 
the environment.  Examples include recycling, clean up, community gardens, and 
so on.  Second, even if JG workers are not directly engaged in activities related to 
the environment, an economy brought to full employment through the JG will be 
more sustainable than one in which the job creation comes through stimulating 
private sector growth.  JG activities need not use scarce natural resources or 
methods of production that pollute.  There is a whole spectrum of near pure 
services that use virtually no natural resources at all” (2015). 
 
Third, China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe because empirical lessons are 
abundant from a variety of foreign, domestic, formal, and informal adoptions of JG programs. 
Internationally, from WWII to the 1970s, a variety of Western countries adopted informal JG. For 
example, the American New Deal included job creation programs such as the Civilian 
Conservation Corp (CCC) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) that were responsible 
for building much of the U.S. infrastructure that Americans still use today. Sweden developed 
broad based employment programs that substantially increased the availability of public goods and 
virtually guaranteed employment to anyone willing, able, and ready to work. A number of countries 
including Australia maintained “a close approximation of full employment through a combination 
of high aggregate demand plus loosely coordinated direct job creation. Often there would be an 
informal ‘employer of last resort,’ such as the national railroads, that would hire just about anyone” 
(Wray 2012). After its 2001 economic crisis that saw the collapse of its currency sovereignty, 
Argentina created a formal employment Plan Jefes y Jefas that guaranteed a job for poor heads of 
households (Kostzer 2008; Tcherneva 2012). The program “created 2 million new jobs that not 
only provided employment and income for poor families, but also provided needed services and 
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free goods to poor neighborhoods” (Wray 2012). Another example of a formal but partial JG is 
India’s 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. 
Domestically, China has also adopted informal and partial JG programs. For example, 
China’s traditional infrastructure stimulus programs are in effect partial experiments of the JG 
program. The difference is that infrastructure investments stimulus stabilizes employment 
temporarily while the JG program permanently eliminates unemployment. Moreover, 
infrastructure investments stimulus only targets China’s infrastructure while the JG program aims 
to address deficiencies in the Chinese economy, including but not limited to infrastructure needs. 
As another example, China has also experimented partial JG programs in conjunction with its 
ecological immigration. In her essay, Ningxia’s Ecological Immigration Program: An Embryonic Employer 
of Last Resort Program, Li found that, “NEIP [Ningxia Ecological Immigration Program] bears some 
embryonic characteristics of JG green jobs programs” and concluded that,  
It is likely that the personnel responsible for NEIP were never directly exposed to 
the JG literature. However, through their own trial and error from real-world 
experimentation of NEIP over 30 years, the local government in Ningxia has 
figured out a unique program that has made quite some achievements and 
possesses a few features of the JG program (Li 2013). 
 
Finally, the Chinese state is capable to implement a Green JG because the Chinese central 
government as the monopoly issuer of RMB possesses the monetary sovereignty necessary to 
sustainably finance a Chinese Green JG, which I discuss further in section V. 
In this section, I have explained why China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe. While 
the demand-side reasons concern with why China needs a Green JG, the supply-side reasons concern 
with why China is ready to implement a Green JG. My conclusions are as follows. First, the Green 
JG’s ability to address the structural defect of a market economy – persistent and structural 
unemployment – qualifies it to contribute to and to benefit from China’s pursuit of a socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics. The Green JG does not replace the market economy 
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but instead makes it better. Hence, China faces no significant political or ideological obstacles to 
implement a socialist policy like the Green JG. Second, China’s environmental policy climate since 
2005 has sought synthesized environmental-economic policies to address the contradiction 
between economic growth and environmental sustainability. The Green JG qualifies as such a 
policy to promote both full employment and environmental sustainability. Third, there have been 
abundant empirical lessons from a variety of foreign, domestic, formal, and informal adoptions of 
JG programs. China can learn from these experiences when crafting and implementing its Green 
JG. Finally, China possesses monetary sovereignty, which is a key economic precondition for 
pursuing a JG program. 
IV.  The Economic Benefits and Costs of a Chinese Green JG 
 
In this section, I calculate the true cost of implementing a full-fledged Chinese Green JG 
program by computing the economic benefit of JG and the economic cost of financing it. Since 
JG eliminates unemployment, the economic benefit of JG lies in eliminating the output loss arising 
from unemployment. Therefore, to calculate the economic benefits of JG, I use two methods to 
estimate China’s lost output arising from its unemployment – the “average product” method 
(which estimates the lost output by multiplying the average GDP per Chinese worker/peasant46 
by the number of Chinese unemployed workers) and the “Okun’s Law” method (which is a 
generally accepted empirical rule that describes a quantitative relationship between changes in 
unemployment and changes in GDP). The intuition here is that as China achieves full 
employment, its GDP growth will expand. My work here is simply to estimate the size of that 
GDP expansion due to the elimination of unemployment. 
 
46 China’s Household Registration System specifies a Chinese citizen’s origin as either rural or urban. 
“Peasant” is the official term in China to describe a Chinese citizen with a rural origin that lives and works in 
rural China. 
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I first use the “average product” method, which requires the knowing of the number of 
unemployed workers in China and the average GDP per worker in China. According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, as of December 2019 China had an urban labor-force-
survey unemployment rate of 5.2% and a total urban employment of 442.47 million (NBSC 2020). 
This means that in 2019, China had a total urban labor force of 466.74 million. Combined with 
the 5.2% urban unemployment rate, China had 24.27 million unemployed workers in 2019. Note 
that this figure assumes that the rural Chinese who worked as peasants in 2019 had no intention 
to migrate to cities to become peasant-workers47. Hence, the 24.27 million urban unemployment 
is a conservative estimate of China’s overall unemployment. Considering that Chinese peasants 
are guaranteed access to at least some land in rural China, this is probably a reasonable assumption 
as well. 
In 2019, China’s GDP reached 99.0865 trillion RMB by employing a total of 774.71 million 
workers that included 442.47 million urban employment and 332.24 million rural employment 
(NBSC 2020). This means that the average GDP per Chinese worker/peasant is 127,901 RMB in 
2019. Multiplying China’s 24.27 million urban unemployment by the average GDP per Chinese 
worker/peasant (127,901 RMB) yields a lost output arising from China’s unemployment in 2019 
of 3.104 trillion RMB, which was 3.13% of China’s 2019 GDP. In other words, the “average 
product” method shows that the 24.27 million urban people unemployed cost the Chinese 
economy approximately 3.13% of GDP in 2019. 
Note that the “average product” method assumes that the unemployed Chinese workers 
are, on average, contributing the same amount of value-added to China’s GDP as an average 
employed worker/peasant in China. It is possible that the average unemployed urban Chinese 
 
47 “peasant-worker(s)” is the official term used in China to describe a peasant (with a specified “rural” 
status in the Household Registration Book) who works and lives in urban China, often in precarious conditions. 
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worker, once employed, contributes less value-added to GDP than the average currently employed 
urban Chinese worker. However, an argument can also be made that the average unemployed 
urban Chinese worker is more productive, in terms of their total value-added contribution to 
GDP, than the average currently employed rural peasant (which account for 43% of China’s total 
labor force in 2019) (NBSC 2020). Hence, by accounting for both urban and rural labor’s value-
added contribution to GDP, the average GDP per worker/peasant figure that I used in my 
calculation should serve as a reasonable measurement for estimating the potential value-added 
contribution of GDP from an average urban unemployed worker in China. 
To ensure that my assumption above was reasonable and even conservative, I use the 
“Okun’s Law” method to cross-examine China’s lost GDP arising from unemployment. As 
mentioned before, Okun’s Law is a generally accepted and tested empirical rule that describes a 
quantitative correlation between changes in unemployment and changes in GDP. Okun, in his 
1962 paper, Potential GDP: Its Measurement and Significance, found that 1% reduction in the 
unemployment rate corresponded with a 3% increase in real GDP, which implied an “Okun 
coefficient” of 3. Since Okun, there have been some revisions to Okun’s method and extensions 
to other time periods and other countries (Altig, Fitzgerald, and Rupert 1977, Lee 2000, Dritsaki, 
Chaido and Nikolaos Dritsakis, 2009). Consequently, the empirically tested Okun coefficients 
have varied by time and by country and have mostly fallen between 1.5 and 3. In order to be 
conservative in estimating the benefits of JG, I use an Okun coefficient of 1.5 to estimate China’s 
lost GDP arising from unemployment. 
A conservative Okun coefficient of 1.5, combined with China’s 5.2% urban labor-force-
survey unemployment rate in 2019, suggests that China’s lost GDP amounts to 7.8% in 2019. This 
means that a fully-fledged JG program would have contributed an additional 7.8% to China’s 
existing 6.1% GDP growth rate in 2019, reaching a whopping 13.9% GDP growth rate. However, 
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this calculation exaggerates the economic benefit of JG because it would be a mistake to use the 
5.2% urban labor-force-survey unemployment rate as a measurement for China’s overall 
unemployment rate (NBSC 2020). This is because the unemployment rate for the rural Chinese is 
supposedly zero as Chinese peasants are guaranteed access to at least some land in rural China. It 
is for this reason that the National Bureau of Statistics of China only reports urban unemployment 
rate. Therefore, I compute China’s overall unemployment rate by dividing China’s total number 
of urban unemployed workers by its total labor force that includes both urban and rural labor 
forces. 
My calculation before already showed that China’s total urban unemployment in 2019 was 
24.27 million. In 2019, China’s total labor force equals to the sum of total rural labor force (332.24 
million) and total urban labor force (466.74 million), which is 798.98 million. The 24.27 million 
urban unemployment, combined with China’s total labor force of 798.98 million in 2019, suggests 
that China’s overall unemployment rate in 2019 should be 3.03% (NBSC 2020). Then, using an 
Okun coefficient of 1.5, I determine that China’s lost output arising from unemployment in 2019 
amounted to approximately 4.55% of 2019 GDP. 
Recall that the “average product” method suggests that China’s lost output arising from 
unemployment in 2019 equals to 3.13% of GDP. The “Okun’s Law” method computes a greater 
output loss even with my conservative choice of the Okun coefficient. This discrepancy, however, 
is expected. This is because the “average product” method assumes the number of unemployed 
workers to be fixed while the “Okun’s Law” method considers actual historical patterns that each 
additional percentage point reduction in unemployment rate requires even more jobs to be created, 
as Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsay explained: 
Okun’s coefficients take into account actual historical patterns. One of the 
theorized reasons why the coefficients are consistently above 1 is that as more jobs 
become available, more people will enter the labor force to look for jobs. Thus, an 
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economy will actually have to be employing a higher number of people in order 
for the unemployment rate to fall each additional percentage point (2015) 
 
Above I have estimated the GDP cost of unemployment in China using the “average 
product” method and the “Okun’s Law” method. The conclusion is that urban unemployment in 
China costs between 3.13% to 4.55% of GDP per year. Note that in both methods, I used the 
more conservative estimates whenever possible to calculate the GDP cost of unemployment. Since 
my proposed Green JG eliminates unemployment by offering a publicly funded job to anyone 
willing, able, and ready to work, the economic benefit of JG is precisely in eliminating the lost 
GDP arising from Chinese unemployment. This means that a full employment Chinese economy 
would have grown an additional 3.13% to 4.55% of GDP in 2019, reaching a total GDP growth 
rate in the 9.23% to 10.65% range. 
To complete the cost-benefit analysis of a Chinese JG, I now calculate the cost of financing 
it. For consistency, I continue to use 24.27 million as the total number of unemployed workers in 
China. I assume the JG wage to be 3700 RMB per month48. On top of that, I assume an additional 
35% of the total wage bill to cover the “Five Insurances”49 benefit costs and another 10% of the 
total wage bill to pay for all the logistical and material costs associated with executing the JG 
program. The financial costs of implementing a JG in China are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 3,700 RMB per month was the average monthly income for peasant workers in China in 2018. I used this 
figure in my calculation due to the unavailability of the 2019 data. 
49 “Five Insurances” are considered a generous benefits package for Chinese employees. Together, they account 
for about 35% of an employee’s wage bill. 
84 
 
Table 1: Chinese Job Guarantee Cost Estimates (Author’s Calculations) 
Average 
JG Wage 
(RMB) 
Number of 
JG Workers 
Employed 
Total 
Wage Bill 
(RMB) 
Total 
Annual 
Benefits 
(RMB) 
Logistical 
and Material 
Costs (RMB) 
Total 
Financing 
Cost of JG 
(RMB) 
Cost of 
JG as 
Percentage 
of 2019 
GDP 
3,700 24.27 
million 
1.077588 
trillion 
0.3771558 
trillion 
0.1077588 
trillion 
1.5625026 
trillion 
1.58% 
 
Hence, from a strictly economic point of view, the economic benefit of having a JG 
program is between 3.13% and 4.55% of China’s 2019 GDP. The cost of having a JG program is 
1.58%. The net economic benefit for a Chinese JG program is therefore overwhelmingly positive. 
In other words, increasing China’s fiscal deficit by 1.58% of 2019 GDP would be enough to 
finance a complete Chinese Green JG to eliminate China’s 24.27 million urban unemployment 
and elevate China’s GDP growth rate from 6.1% to the 9.23% and 10.65% range in 2019. 
It is important to note that, in my analysis, I have purposefully underestimated the benefits 
of JG and overestimated the costs of implementing it in order to make a more compelling case. I 
underestimated the benefits of JG because I only conservatively quantified the economic growth 
benefit as a result of full employment. Other benefits of a Green JG, such as social stability, 
environmental sustainability, and economic security for the Chinese people, are arguably more 
valuable despite not being assigned a monetary value. On the other hand, I purposefully 
overestimated the cost of implementing it. For instance, a full employment Chinese economy will 
spend less on unemployment insurance and crime prevention. Spending by JG workers will also 
contribute to tax revenue. Hence, financing the JG program reduces government spending in 
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other areas and increases tax revenue through the macroeconomic simulative effects from 
increased consumption from JG workers. The true cost of implementing a Chinese JG should 
thus be much less than the projected 1.58% of China’s 2019 GDP. 
V.  Sustainability and Functionality of China’s Deficit Spending 
 
Even though a Chinese JG makes economic sense for the Chinese economy, some may 
be concerned about the sustainability of China’s deficit spending and national debt. Proponents 
of fiscal austerity or “sound finance” often cite Greece as an example to illustrate the disastrous 
outcome of irresponsible government deficits. In this section, I debunk the myth of sound finance 
by examining China’s, Greece’s, and the United States’ sector balances. My thinking has been 
inspired by the vast literature from functional finance, Modern Money Theory, credit theory of 
money, and state theory of money (Lerner 1943, Knapp 1973, Minsky 1993, Goodhart 1998, Wray 
1998, and Bell 2000, Forstater 2000, etc.). My conclusions are as follows. First, for a monetary 
sovereign country like China or the U.S., government deficits are not only sustainable but also 
functional to stabilize private sector balance sheets. Second, Greece’s Euro debt crisis in 2008 was 
not due to the irresponsible deficit spending by the Greece government. Greece’s increased 
government deficits post-2008 were the results of the crisis, not the causes of it. Greece’s Euro 
debt crisis was inevitable when Greece relinquished its monetary sovereignty (Greek Drachma) to 
adopt the Euro in 2001 during which Greece’s trade deficits were quickly expanding. 
Before presenting the results of China’s, the U.S.’s, and Greece’s sector balances, it is 
necessary to explain what a sector balance is. At the level of a country’s macroeconomy, aggregate 
spending is, by accounting identity, equal to aggregate income (i.e. every RMB spent is received as 
income). Wynne Godley in 1996 suggested that it would be useful to divide a country’s 
macroeconomy into three sectors – domestic government (central and local), domestic private 
(firms and households), and foreign sector (the rest of the world). This means that “If one sector 
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spends more than its income (deficit), at least one other must spend less than its income (surplus) 
to maintain the aggregate identity that total spending equals total income. The balances (income 
minus expenditure) of the three sectors have to add up to zero since we are adding up all the 
income in the economy and subtracting all the spending, which are equal by identity” (Wray 2019). 
Hence, as a macroeconomic accounting identity, “Domestic Private Sector Balance + 
Domestic Government Sector Balance + Foreign Sector Balance = 0” holds true for any country. 
Based on this accounting identity, I produced China’s 3-Sector Balances as percentage of GDP 
from 1978 to 2018. The result is as follows. 
 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Figure 10: China’s 3-Sector Balances 1978-2018 
 
Important insights can be gathered by examining China’s 3-sector balances as % of GDP 
from 1978 to 2018. First, the Chinese private sector balances (blue bars) have mostly been in the 
surplus territory, which were made possible by the Foreign Sector deficits (green bars) and the 
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Chinese government sector deficits (red bars). Note that the Foreign Sector deficits are, by 
definition, China’s foreign trade surpluses. In other words, the Chinese private sector surpluses 
were made possible by China’s foreign trade surpluses and the Chinese government deficits. 
Indeed, it is healthy that the Chinese private sector (firms and households) has been net 
accumulating financial wealth at around 5% of GDP per year since 1997. In 2015, the Chinese 
private sector achieved its highest surplus as % of GDP at around 8%. Since 2015, however, the 
Chinese private sector surplus as a % of GDP has declined noticeably, mostly due to the decline 
of Foreign Sector deficits (green bars), which meant that China’s trade surpluses as % of GDP 
had declined. 
Second, the Chinese governments balance, which includes central and local governments 
balances, has consistently been in the negative territory (represented by the red bars). This is 
desirable since Chinese government deficits, together with China’s foreign trade surpluses, have 
been necessary to enable the Chinese private sector to run surpluses historically. Moreover, the 
consolidated Chinese government deficits from 2015 to 2018 had expanded as % of GDP, which 
offset some of the pressure arising from China’s reduced foreign trade surpluses as % of GDP 
during the same period. However, since 2015, the increases in China’s government deficit as % of 
GDP have not been large enough to offset the decreases in China’s trade surplus as % of GDP. 
As a result, China’s private sector surplus as % of GDP has declined from around 8% in 2015 to 
6% of GDP in 2018. 
Third, China’s 3-sector balances suggest that China’s financial system has been in a sound 
position for most of the years since 1978. This is because China’s three sectors have been in their 
sustainable territories most of the time. First, it is sustainable for the Foreign Sector (green bars) 
to remain in the deficit territory since that simply means that China runs an international trade 
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surplus against the rest of the world.50 Second, it is sustainable for the Chinese government sector 
(red bars) to remain in the deficit territory since the Chinese government (the Chinese central 
government, to be precise), as the sole issuer of RMB, faces no default risk on RMB-denominated 
debt. The default risk for the Chinese central government bonds is zero not because the 
international credit market deems RMB bonds trustworthy but because the Chinese central 
government pays interests of its bonds (which are denominated in RMB) by crediting RMB into 
existence.51 Third, it is sustainable and even necessary for the Chinese private sector to remain in 
the surplus territory. This is because private sector surpluses represent accumulation of private 
savings that strengthen the financial positions of firms and households who, as currency users of 
RMB, face real default risk. An implication is that if China’s foreign trade surpluses as % of GDP 
decline, the Chinese government deficits must expand to facilitate surpluses for the Chinese 
private sector. 
However, China’s 3-sector balance does not tell the complete story. Using government 
finances data on the National Bureau of Statistics of China, I have disaggregated China’s 
government balance into Chinese central government balance and Chinese local governments 
balance. The result is a 4-sector balance for the Chinese economy shown as below. Note that the 
4-sector balance is, in principle, the same as the 3-sector balance, since they are based on the same 
accounting identity that aggregate spending equals to aggregate income for any given country’s 
macroeconomy. 
 
50 However, the size of the green bars (i.e. China’s trade surplus as % of GDP) may decrease as China transitions to 
a consumption-led economy. Also, it is not sustainable for every country to accumulate trade surpluses – for there 
to be a trade surplus, there must generate a trade deficit. 
51 This is the same reason why the United States Federal Government can never be forced to default on USD-
denominated liabilities. 
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Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Figure 11: China’s 4-Sector Balances 1978-2018 
 
As expected, China’s 4-sector balance shares some common information with its 3-sector 
counterpart. For example, it still shows that China’s private sector surplus (blue bars) has been 
around 5% of GDP since 1997. It also shows foreign sector running deficits (green bars) against 
China since 1994, which is identically equivalent to China’s running foreign trade surpluses since 
1994. However, China’s 4-sector balance reflects a critical concern within the Chinese economy. 
Most notably, we can see that the Chinese central government (represented by the yellow 
bars), as the sole issuer of RMB, has run consistent surpluses since 1994. The contribution from 
foreign sector deficits (i.e. China’s trade surpluses) to China’s private sector surpluses were almost 
entirely offset by the Chinese central government surpluses (i.e. the yellow bars and the green bars 
approximately offset each other). On the other hand, China’s local governments (represented by 
the black bars), as RMB users, have run consistent budget deficits to enable the Chinese private 
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sector surpluses. This means that without the large deficit spending by the Chinese local 
governments, China’s private sector would not have been in surplus position in the last two 
decades. 
China’s case indeed reflects China’s particularity. The United States and other monetary 
sovereignty countries normally run federal government deficits and balanced local government 
budgets. This is because a central/federal government with monetary sovereignty is not revenue 
constrained whereas local governments are. When the Chinese treasury spends, it creates RMB 
into existence. This represents an injection of income into the private sector, which becomes 
private savings. When the Chinese central government taxes, it destroys RMB, which represents a 
leakage of income out of the Chinese private sector. Chinese local governments, however, are 
revenue constrained since they cannot spend RMB into existence. They must spend by raising 
enough revenue through local tax collection, land sales, bank loans, and/or issuance of local 
government bonds, etc. 
Therefore, it makes little sense for the Chinese central government, as the sole issuer of 
RMB, to run surpluses that are denominated in RMB. It is irrational because the Chinese central 
government cannot default on RMB-denominated liabilities, and hence an RMB surplus for the 
Chinese central government is meaningless if the concern is for the Chinese central government 
to remain solvent and operational. This particularity reflects an anachronistic thinking dating back 
to the pre-1971 Gold Standard era during which all countries were effectively currency users by 
pegging their currencies to gold and silver. The Chinese central government, with monetary 
sovereignty, can and should practice “functional finance” (Lerner 1943). This means that the 
Chinese central government should conduct fiscal and monetary policies according to the desirable 
effects of these policies, not according to some pre-established doctrine about what is sound or 
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unsound (such as the so-called 3% deficit to GDP rule in the Maastricht Treaty adopted by the 
EU).  
It is important to note that functional finance by no means suggests unlimited government 
spending, not does it ignore that fact that government deficits may create inflationary pressures. 
Indeed, if the economy is already at full employment, any additional deficit spending will be purely 
inflationary without creating jobs or increasing economic growth. If the economy is below full 
employment, however, deficit spending increases aggregate demand and aggregate supply at the 
same time, which may or may not cause substantial inflation. The other issue is that due to 
automation, conventional government deficit spending may promote economic growth but not 
job growth. It is therefore that deficits used to finance a Chinese Green JG is particularly desirable 
because it directly create jobs, which then organically promotes economic growth. 
In theory, it is not sustainable for the Chinese local governments to remain in the deficit 
position, let alone running a deficit close to 10% of GDP per year. The Chinese local governments, 
just like private firms and households, face real default risk. In practice, however, this has not been 
an issue since the Chinese local governments have been guaranteed financing by the Chinese state-
owned banks. Therefore, if the Chinese local governments continue to obtain financing from 
banks or find buyers of its local government bonds, this should not develop into a systemic 
financial issue for the Chinese economy. An important implication, however, is that the Chinese 
state must not adopt a fiscal austerity reform on the Chinese local governments until the Chinese 
central government starts running sizable deficits itself. 
I am also including the 3-sector balance for the United States from 1960 to 2019 here to 
emphasize the sustainability and functionality of government deficits for a monetary sovereign 
country. The graph below is taken from Randall Wray’s congressional testimony for the United 
States House Budget Committee on November 20, 2019. 
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Figure 12: U.S. Sector Balances 1960-2019 
 
As we can see, the United States private sector (blue bars) has been in the surplus territory 
most of the time, which is what should happen in a healthy economy. The difference as compared 
to China is that the United States runs a foreign trade deficit, which means that the rest of the 
world runs a surplus against it (green bars). This means that for the U.S. private sector to run a 
surplus, the U.S. domestic government must not only run a deficit but also run a large enough 
deficit (one that is larger than the size of its trade deficit). Hence, it is not surprising that the U.S. 
government has been historically running a deficit to GDP ratio exceeding 5% and even as high 
as 13% during the 2008 financial crisis. Note that these deficits never entailed actual bankruptcy 
risks for the U.S. federal government after 1971 when the U.S. dollars delinked from gold. Indeed, 
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some U.S. policymakers, including Ben Bernanke52 and Alan Greenspan,53 have made it explicit 
that the U.S. federal deficits and national debts are sustainable due to the U.S. federal government’s 
monetary sovereignty with the U.S. dollars. An article by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis states it plainly, 
As the sole manufacturer of dollars, whose debt is denominated in dollars, the U.S. 
[federal] government can never become insolvent, i.e., unable to pay its bills. In 
this sense, the government is not dependent on credit markets to remain 
operational (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2011). 
 
By running massive government deficits after 2008, the U.S. stabilized the balance sheets 
of private firms and households (shown as the long blue bars after 2008). Part of the deficits were 
the fiscal spending stimulus program carried out by the Obama administration, and part of the 
deficits were simply automatically generated – when unemployment rises, tax revenue goes down 
and government spending on unemployment insurance goes up, which together increases 
government deficit. It is also important to note that the U.S. economy and employment have 
remained strong in recent years despite an ongoing trade war with China largely due to the 
enlarging government deficits under the Trump administration that stabilized the U.S. private 
sector surpluses and hence the U.S. domestic consumption. 
In short, government deficits are necessary to stabilize private sector surpluses, especially 
for countries that run trade deficits. Theoretically, with its foreign trade surpluses, the Chinese 
government can run surpluses (so long as the size of fiscal surplus is smaller than the size of 
China’s trade surplus) together with the Chinese private sector. However, it simply makes no sense 
for the Chinese government (especially the Chinese central government), as the monopoly issuer 
 
52 Ben Bernanke was the U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman from 2006 to 2014. In an interview with Scott Pelley in 
2009, Bernanke was asked by Pelley, “Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?” Bernanke answered, “It’s not tax 
money. We simply use the computer to mark up the size of the account.” 
53 Alan Greenspan was the U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman from 1987 to 2006. His statement in 2011 caused quite a 
stir when he said, “The United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print money to do that. So 
there is zero probability of default.” 
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of RMB, to accumulate budget surpluses denominated in RMB. If the Chinese central government 
decides to run surpluses, it should be for reasons other than an anachronistic sense of fiscal 
responsibility. Otherwise, its budget surpluses only decrease Chinese private sector surpluses. 
To complete my analysis on the sustainability and functionality of government deficits, I 
now examine Greece’s sector balances. Greece is an interesting case because proponents of fiscal 
austerity have blamed Greece’s Euro debt crisis to irresponsible government deficits. Greece was 
once a monetary sovereign country that voluntarily gave up its monetary sovereignty in 2001 when 
it abolished Greek Drachma and adopted Euro. Its 3-sector balances from 1980 to 2018 are as 
follows. 
 
Sources: OECD data 
 
Figure 13: Greece’s Sector Balances 1980-2018 
 
Important insights can be gathered by analyzing Greece’s 3-sector balances from 1980 to 
2018. First, it was clear that the Greece government was actively reducing its deficit-to-GDP ratio 
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from 1995 to 2000 in order to satisfy EU’s fiscal austerity requirement to join the Eurozone. The 
Greek Government deficit (red bars) as % of GDP reduced from 13% in 1990 to about 4.5% in 
2000, the year prior to the Greece adopting the Euro. However, this supposed “fiscal 
responsibility” has also resulted in the Greece’s private sector surpluses as % of GDP (blue bars) 
significantly reducing from a 9% surplus in 1990 to a 4% deficit in 2000. 
Meanwhile, Greece’s foreign trade deficits (the reverse of the green bars) expanded 
significantly after adopting the Euro, as the Foreign Sector was net accumulating more surpluses 
(green bars) against the Greece economy from 4% of GDP in 1999 to a whopping 15% in 2008. 
These rapidly expanding Foreign Sector surpluses, combined with the Greek governments’ low 
deficit as % of GDP, translated into nine consecutive years of deficits for the Greece domestic 
private sector (blue bars) from 2000 to 2008 (with the exception of a small private sector surplus 
in 2005 due to increased government deficit that year). In 2007, the year prior to the 2008 Euro 
debt crisis, the Greece private sector reached a historic high deficit-to-GDP ratio of 7%. 
It is unhealthy for the domestic private sector in any country to keep running deficits since 
private firms and households, as currency users, face real default risk if they could not obtain 
enough income denominated in the same currency to service debt commitments. In the case of 
Greece, those income and debt commitments were denominated in Euro, which could not be 
printed by the Greece private sector nor the Greece government (who had recently lost its 
monetary sovereignty in 2001). As the Greece private sector deficits accumulated, default rate 
within the Greek economy increased substantially, and unemployment rate rose. The Greece 
government thus saw its tax revenue decreasing and spending on social security increasing after 
2000, which automatically enlarged Greece governments’ deficits. But even then, to comply with 
EU’s fiscal austerity, the Greece government deficit (red bars) increased only moderately from 
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2000 to 2007. The Greece government deficit reached around 7% of GDP in 2007 (right before 
the Euro debt crisis), which was still on the lower end of Greece’s historical deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
To finance its deficits, which are denominated in Euros, the Greece government had to 
issue Greek government bonds that were also denominated in Euros. The problem, however, is 
that this time the Greek government, as a currency user of Euros, could not simply print Euros 
into existence to service its Euro-denominated debt when it comes due. It was thus a matter of 
time before the market realized that the Greek bonds had a much higher default risk than German 
bonds since Germany could “afford” to run low budget deficits with a strong foreign trade 
surpluses whereas the Greek government could actually default on Euro-denominated debt as it 
net-loses Euros every year due to trade deficits. As it became clear that the Greek government 
could not possibly pay its Euro-denominated debt, Greece pulled the political leverage by 
threatening to exit the Eurozone. Greece was then able to negotiate a deal with the EU and the 
European Central Bank (primarily Germany) to continue financing its government deficit 
spending and find ways to lower Greece’s trade deficits. These efforts stabilized the Greece private 
sector. The Greece private sector (blue bars) has since run surpluses for the most years after 2009. 
However, it is now again in the negative territory from 2016 to 2018, which is concerning. The 
difference is that this time the Greece private sector deficits are relatively smaller as % of GDP 
compared to when it first adopted the Euro in 2001. Hence, it may take longer for the Greece’s 
second domestic financial crisis to materialize. 
Nevertheless, the design of the Eurozone is problematic in its core. By adopting Euros, 
each Eurozone member country voluntarily gave up its monetary sovereignty and effectively 
became a local government as part of this “Eurozone Nation.” As currency users of Euro, these 
Euro countries all have a default risk greater than zero, with some riskier than the others. The 
problem is that the Eurozone has a central bank (the EMU) to conduct monetary policy but not 
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a central government that conducts redistribution fiscal policies. For example, there is tremendous 
political obstacle to “transfer” Germany’s tax revenue to fund fiscal spending in the Greece 
economy. The Eurozone, as many have argued, was therefore designed to fail. Perhaps Germany 
benefited from the Eurozone by expanding its exporting advantages against other EU member 
countries. But it is especially difficult for the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and 
Spain) to operate as these countries’ exporting industries were devastated by Germany’s after 
adopting the Euro. 
What is important to us is that Greece’s increased government deficits were the results of 
the crisis, not the causes of it. Greece’s Euro debt crisis in 2008 was not due to the irresponsible 
deficit spending by the Greece government, since Greece’s deficit-to-GDP ratios were on the 
lower end compared to Greece’s historical records. Quite the opposite, it was the Greece 
government’s inability to deficit spend due to its loss of monetary sovereignty, combined with 
Greece’s deteriorating trade deficits, that resulted in the Greece private sector deficits for nine 
consecutive years, which ultimately collapsed the Greek economy. Hence, what Greece’s Euro 
debt crisis demonstrates is the disastrous outcome when a monetary sovereignty country gives up 
its monetary sovereignty, not the unsustainability of fiscal deficits. In fact, it is fiscally irresponsible 
for a government with monetary sovereignty to not run deficits since doing so reduces its domestic 
private sector surpluses. 
In a nutshell, for a monetary sovereignty country like China or the U.S., government 
deficits and national debts denominated in its own sovereign currency are sustainable. The worst 
outcome of too much deficit spending is inflation, not default. The problems, however, are 
corporate, household, and local government deficits and debts. Continuous corporate, household, 
and local government deficits are not sustainable because firms, households, and local 
governments as currency users face real default risks. When a substantial number of firms, 
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households, and local governments cannot receive enough income stream to validate their debt 
payments, a systematic meltdown of the financial system will likely occur because of interlocking 
balance sheets (Minsky 1986). 
The main takeaways are as follows. When it comes to the sustainability and functionality 
of Chinese government deficits, my 3-sector Chinese sector balance shows that historically the 
Chinese private sector surpluses have been made possible with China’s trade surpluses and the 
Chinese governments’ overall deficits (which are sustainable). My 4-sector balance approach, 
however, points out a critical concern regarding the composition of the Chinese government 
deficits. The Chinese central government has historically been running sizable surpluses that for 
the most part offset the contribution of China’s foreign trade surpluses to China’s private sector 
surpluses. Thus, the Chinese private sector surpluses have been made possible almost entirely by 
the large deficits of the Chinese local governments. I argue that it makes little sense for the Chinese 
central government as the issuer of RMB to run RMB surpluses and for the Chinese local 
governments as users of RMB to run continuous and large RMB deficits. My 4-sector Chinese 
sector balance also cautions that the Chinese state must not adopt a fiscal austerity reform on the 
Chinese local governments until the Chinese central government starts running sizable deficits 
itself. Otherwise, financial instability within the Chinese economy will likely occur. The Chinese 
central government ran a budget surplus equaling 5.7% of China’s 2019 GDP. Reducing it to 
4.34% would have been enough to finance a complete Chinese Green JG (which costs 1.58% of 
GDP as estimated before) to eliminate China’s 24 million urban unemployment and organically 
elevate China’s 2019 GDP growth rate to the 9.23% and 10.65% range. 
After addressing the sustainability and functionality of financing a Chinese Green JG with 
Chinese government deficits, I now discuss the design of a Chinese Green JG. 
VI.  Designing a Chinese Green JG 
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A Chinese JG program should be designed and implemented in a way that embraces 
China’s particularity and priority. Therefore, in my previous analysis, in addition to introduce what 
a JG is, I have theorized why China would especially benefit from a Green JG, why China’s time 
to implement a Green JG is ripe, how much a Chinese JG would contribute to China’s GDP 
growth and cost China’s fiscal budget, and why the financing cost of a JG is not only sustainable 
but also functional for China. I apply the same logic now to inquire how a Chinese Green JG 
should be administered, what types of jobs a Chinese Green JG should create, and why China’s 
implementation of a Green JG should follow a gradualist approach. 
a).  Administration of a Chinese Green JG 
Considering that the Chinese central government as an RMB issuer is not revenue-
constrained and that the Chinese provincial and local governments as RMB users face real default 
risks, the Chinese central government should fund the bulk, if not all, of the JG program. 
Contributions from other entities, such as provincial and local governments and social 
philanthropists, are not necessary for financing purpose, but may still be encouraged to achieve 
other desirable purposes. For example, requiring provincial and local governments to finance a 
part of the JG program might encourage more attentive implementation of JG at the provincial 
and local level. On the other hand, encouraging social philanthropists to contribute to the JG 
program could be worthwhile to create a public-private partnership platform for interested social 
philanthropists. 
While the central government provides the financing, provincial and local governments 
should administer the JG. Specifically, provincial and local governments should identify local 
needs, submit corresponding JG proposals that would address these needs to the central 
government, administer the local JG programs by training and organizing the JG workers, and 
evaluating the program. Hence, once identifying an appropriate need, the JG administrator 
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(provincial and local governments) should: 1) consult with experts to assess what specific works 
need to be done to address that need, and 2) propose the corresponding jobs to the central 
government for approval and funding. The central government should play the financier and the 
supervisory role by monitoring the performance of the JG program. 
For example, jobs that enhance China’s environmental service capabilities are important 
and urgent given the substantial costs of environmental pollution on public health. However, the 
private sector normally has little incentive to produce environmental service goods since it is not 
profitable. Green jobs that aim to enhance China’s environmental service capabilities therefore 
seem a natural candidate to be included in a JG for the environmentally degraded regions in China. 
So, administrators of the JG program in these regions should consult with environmental 
engineers to figure out what specific works need to be done and then propose to create the 
corresponding jobs. If the identified need is to tackle desertification and it has been determined 
that (re)forestation is an effective way to address desertification, then provincial and local 
governments should make a tree-planting JG proposal to the central government to be approved 
and funded. 
Should the Chinese state adopt a gradualist approach to implement the Green JG (which 
I argue that it should), there is the added question about who the JG should prioritize in hiring at 
the beginning stage. Again, this should depend on China’s particularity and priority. I suggest that 
military veterans could be prioritized especially since a JG program can help them gain skills and 
work experience in the civilian economy and transition them to perhaps find employment in the 
market economy sector in the future. 
b).  Types of Jobs in a Chinese Green JG 
After discussing the administration of the Green JG in China, I explore the types of jobs 
that could be created in a Chinses Green JG. In principle, the types of jobs created through a 
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Chinese JG program are flexible through time because they should address the evolving 
deficiencies in the Chinese market economy. At any point in time, however, a JG program should 
create jobs in areas that are important and urgent but have been neglected by the market due to 
the lack of profit opportunities. My recommendation therefore reflects my understanding of the 
important areas that could be improved in the Chinese market economy as of 2020. For more 
fruitful identification of the deficiencies in the Chinese economy, local communities and 
governments of all levels could speak with more knowledge. Nevertheless, I am proposing the 
following three broad categories of JG jobs that I believe would be feasible and beneficial to the 
Chinese economy and society. 
The first type, as I have repeatedly suggested in my essay, are the Green Jobs that aim to 
directly employ JG workers in activities that enhance the environment. The goal is to promote 
employment and environmental sustainability. As Forstater suggests, “it may be desirable to create 
an Environmental Service Corps, or Green Corps… [that] help society satisfy the biophysical 
conditions for a sustainable economy” (2003). I believe that the Chinese economy would especially 
benefit from establishing the Green Corps as a major component of its JG program to increase 
its environmental service capabilities and to better tackle its environmental issues. Examples of 
Green Corps jobs include reforestation, recycling, environmental cleanup, wildlife preservation, 
and community gardening, etc. Green Corps are suitable JG jobs also because much of these 
works are labor-intensive and require little training. As Forstater further explains the potential 
educational role of Green Corps in addition to their direct environmental service efforts, 
PSE [Public Service Employment] workers can visit classrooms and workplaces 
and do presentations. They can set up tables in the community to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and simplicity of many sustainable practices… Doubtless there are 
many other areas where PSE workers can perform environmental services. The 
development of a Green Corps will provide a reservoir of labor that can contribute 
to sustainability in many ways… (Forstater 2003). 
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The second type are the cultural heritage preservation jobs that would be conducive to 
promote confidence in Chinese path, system, theory, and culture. As globalization expands, 
cultures interchange. However, since modernization largely meant westernization for China in the 
past several decades, China has been a net culture importer, which entails both benefits and 
challenges. One notable challenge, however, is that the U.S. and western values and cultures 
exported via the Hollywood are often presented as timeless and superior to the Chinese and other 
countries’ traditional values. This has the potential to create a clash of civilization or an ideology 
war within China among different generations and social classes. Hence, as globalization continues 
to do its work, a cultural heritage preservation program provides important sources to Chinese 
citizens. Instead of picking a winner, the cultural heritage preservation program helps the Chinese 
society be more informed of traditional Chinese values and cultures and their contemporary 
relevancy. Many of the cultural heritage preservation jobs requires specialized knowledge, which 
are perfect for the millions of Chinese university graduates majoring in humanities and arts that 
could not find suitable employments in the market economy.54 As Kaboub describes, 
[cultural heritage preservation workers are] devoted to information dissipation, 
conservation of local/regional history, culture, and traditions. Such projects would 
involve higher education graduates with degrees/specializations in history, 
anthropology, sociology, computer science, geology, psychology, ethnography, 
social work, folklore studies, literature, religious studies, art, art history, 
photography, journalism, communications, statistics, music, dance, graphic design, 
and architecture… (Kaboub 2007). 
 
Cultural heritage preservation in China is currently mostly done by the Chinese state. 
Instead of the government preaching traditional values to Chinese citizens, the JG workers (such 
as the university graduates majoring in Chinese literature, history, and arts, etc.) might do a more 
effective job communicating to the public, especially with the synergistic effects of social medias. 
 
54 Doing so also alleviates pressure for the Chinese STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) 
majors to find employment in the market economy sector. 
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For example, my mother initiated an early childhood philosophy education program that, in my 
view, presented the contemporary relevancy and charm of Chinese traditional values, such as the 
roles of altruism and collectivism in a modern competitive society. While she continues to make 
all educational materials (in the forms of cartoon videos and audio stories) free to the public, her 
program can certainly benefit from the help of cultural heritage preservation workers to create 
new content and reach a greater audience. 
As another example, the word “economics” in traditional Chinese culture came from Bao 
Puzi’s (Jin Dynasty, 243-343) “manage worldly affairs (经世) and help the people (济民),” which 
emphasized the managing role of the political state in economic affairs as opposed to promoting 
a free market. This certainly is consistent with China’s economic system today. In other instances, 
JG workers in the cultural heritage preservation program can help document, interpret, recreate, 
and celebrate China’s traditional culture, philosophy, and multiethnic heritage. It is through these 
efforts that cultural heritage preservation jobs help promote confidence in the Chinese path, 
system, theory, and culture within the Chinese society to achieve a balance with the western 
cultural hegemony brought by globalization. 
The third type are a broad category of jobs that serve public purposes in general. This 
certainly includes the more traditional infrastructure constructions (such as high-speed railroads). 
It also includes quality-of-life-enhancing activities that are underproduced by the market. 
Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsay listed the following examples: 1) data gathering, as JG workers can 
be hired to gather data to inform better policymaking; 2) support the operations of the JG program 
itself, as “some Job Guarantee workers can be hired to provide transportation, childcare, elderly 
care, community meals, or any other services needed within the Job Guarantee program”; and 3) 
upgrading China’s existing charitable infrastructure by “transforming from one that primarily relies 
on volunteers with minimal experience to… organizations that employ professionally trained full-
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time staff to support the specific mission of the organizations [that are] assisting pilgrims, the 
elderly, people with disabilities, low-income families, orphans, emigrants, and victims of domestic 
violence” (Forstater, Kaboub, and Kelsay 2015). 
c).  A Gradualist Approach to Implement the Chinese Green JG 
Inspired by Fagg Foster’s theory of Institutional Adjustment, I propose a two-phase 
gradualist approach for the Chinese state to implement the Chinese Green JG. Foster’s theory of 
Institutional Adjustment has three components – instrumental primacy, recognized 
interconnectedness, and minimal dislocation (Foster 1981). The significance of Foster’s theory lies 
in the fact that while organizations can change overnight, institutions as habits of thought and 
routines of behaviors cannot (Kaboub 2007). Therefore, to successfully implement a public policy, 
policymakers must be aware of their own ignorance of the proposed policy and social reality (i.e. 
instrumental primacy); policymakers must recognize all interconnected institutions that need to be 
adjusted when implementing the policy (i.e. recognized interconnectedness); and policymakers 
should implement the policy in a way that causes minimal dislocation to the existing institutional 
structure (i.e. minimal dislocation). Hence, Foster’s theory of Institutional Adjustment is a 
gradualist and pragmatist approach to public policy, which has astounding similarities to the 
Chinese state’s reform gradualism and reform pragmatism after 1978, as I elaborated in my first 
essay. 
Therefore, even though a Green JG makes sense economically, politically, socially, and 
environmentally and the Chinese central government faces no financial constraint to finance it, it 
is a new public policy that tests the organizational capabilities of the local governments as well as 
the coordination capabilities among different levels of governments and ministries in China. Given 
that different localities in China face different economic, labor, and environmental realities and 
that the local governments in these localities exhibit different levels of competency in organizing 
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and administering a program like the Green JG, it is sensible to select representative regions to 
experiment the Green JG before rolling it out as a national economic policy. Initial evaluations of 
the JG programs can also be done during this phase. 
The successful administrators of the JG program during phase one, including local and 
provincial officials, can then serve as mentors to help guide other localities and provinces. For 
example, as “the local government in Ningxia has figured out a unique program that has made 
quite some achievements and possesses a few features of the JG program,” it would be reasonable 
to include Ningxia (which is a region that faces severe environmental challenges) in the first phase 
of Green JG (Li 2013). Then, lessons and experiences can be learned and shared for other regions 
like Ningxia to implement their JG programs. 
Again, it is important to emphasize that the above “experiment, evaluate, and expand” 
two-phase approach is consistent with Foster’s theory of Institutional Adjustment and the Chinese 
state’s reform gradualism and pragmatism in shaping China’s socialist market economy since 1978. 
Since China is a large country with roughly 20% of the world population, any benefits or mistakes 
in the national policy level have far-reaching consequences. Hence, a reasonable amount of caution 
is warranted. More importantly, a gradualist approach allows the Chinese state to figure out the 
best practices concerning the implementation of a Chinese Green JG. Promoting best practices is 
certainly much more pragmatist than having all local governments to trial and error the Green JG 
at the same time. Finally, a gradualist approach to implement the Chinese Green JG allows for 
time for the Chinese governments at all levels to develop organizing, coordinating, and evaluating 
capabilities and experiences to implement the Chinese Green JG successfully. 
Conclusion 
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In this paper, I propose a Green Job Guarantee for China to coordinate its goals in 
economic growth, employment, structural adjustments, and environmental sustainability. My key 
findings are as follows: 
First, conventional macroeconomic policies are inefficient at creating jobs by stimulating 
economic growth, due to labor-displacing technical change. Based on Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang’s estimation in 2013 that 1% GDP growth generates 1.5 million more jobs, China’s GDP 
would have needed to grow for an additional 16% to eliminate the 24 million urban unemployment 
figure in 2019. This unrealistic requirement precisely demonstrates the difficulty of translating 
GDP growth to job growth using conventional economic stimulus policies in a world that is 
increasingly automated and capital-intensive. A Job Guarantee, on the other hand, is more 
effective in stabilizing employment because it directly creates jobs, which then organically promote 
economic growth. As I demonstrate, a Chinese JG only “requires” the GDP to grow for an 
additional 3.13% - 4.55% to eliminate China’s 24 million unemployment figure in urban areas. 
Other advantages of a JG include reducing policy instability (since JG is a countercyclical 
macroeconomic stabilizer that automatically expands during economic downturns and contracts 
during economic booms) and complementing, rather than replacing, the market economy. 
Second, China would especially benefit from a Green JG. This is because a Green JG can 
promote China’s economic and employment growth while enhancing the Chinese state’s ability to 
implement the Supply-Side Structural Reform, counter trade wars and international protectionism, 
cope with the slowdown in China’s population growth, transition the Chinese economy to 
domestic consumption-based, increase the effectiveness of its deficit spending, and resolve 
contradictions between economic growth and environmental sustainability. Moreover, a Chinese 
Green JG allows the Chinese SOEs to focus on operational efficiency and international 
competitiveness. 
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Moreover, China’s time to implement a Green JG is ripe. First, the Green JG’s ability to 
address the structural defect of a market economy – persistent and structural unemployment – 
qualifies it to contribute to and to benefit from China’s pursuit of a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics. Unlike countries that follow liberal democracy and market capitalism, 
China faces no significant political or ideological obstacles to implementing a socialist policy like 
the Green JG. Further, a full employment socialist market economy has every reason to be 
confident in its path, theory, system, and culture. Second, China’s environmental policy climate 
since 2005 has sought synthesized environmental-economic policies to address the contradiction 
between economic growth and environmental sustainability. The Green JG qualifies as such a 
policy to promote both full employment and environmental sustainability. Third, there have been 
abundant empirical lessons from a variety of foreign, domestic, formal, and informal adoptions of 
JG programs. China can learn from these experiences. Finally, the Chinese central government 
possesses monetary sovereignty, which is a key economic condition for implementing a JG 
program via deficit spending. 
Afterwards, I show that a Chinese Green JG makes economic sense by calculating its 
economic benefits and costs. With an overall conservative approach and by using the “average 
product” method and the “Okun’s Law” method, I found that the economic benefit of having a 
fully-fledged Chinese Green JG in 2019 is between 3.13% and 4.55% of China’s 2019 GDP. 
Assuming an average JG wage of 3700 RMB per month, a worker’s benefits package worth 35% 
of the total wage bill and a materials and logistics cost worth an additional 10%, the total cost of 
implementing a Chinese JG program in 2019 is 1.58% of China’s 2019 GDP. This means that 
increasing China’s fiscal deficit by another 1.58% of China’s 2019 GDP would have eliminated 
China’s 24.27 million unemployment and created a full employment Chinese economy with a 
GDP growth rate between 9.23% and 10.65% in 2019. In order to make a more compelling 
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economic case, in my calculations I did not account for many other benefits of a Green JG, such 
as its contribution to economic, social, and political stabilities and environmental sustainability. I 
also overestimated the true cost of a JG program since a full employment Chinese economy should 
see reduced spending on unemployment insurance and crime prevention as well as the increased 
tax revenue arising from JG workers’ consumption. 
Since a Chinese Green JG entails increased deficit spending for the Chinese government, 
I examine the sustainability and functionality of Chinese government deficits (and government 
deficits in general) by constructing and examining sector balances for three representative 
countries – China, the U.S., and Greece. My conclusion is that the Chinese government deficits 
to fund the Green JG are not only sustainable but also functional. 
After demonstrating the financial viability of a Chinese Green JG, I theorize the design of 
it. In terms of administering the JG program, my conclusion is that a Chinese Green JG should 
be funded and supervised by the central government and administered by the provincial and local 
governments. Furthermore, should the Chinese state adopt a gradualist approach to implementing 
the Green JG, military veterans could be prioritized in the initial hiring process. In terms of the 
types of jobs appropriate for a Green JG, the principle is that the jobs created through a Chinese 
JG program should be flexible through time to address the evolving deficiencies in the Chinese 
market economy. At any point in time, a JG program should create jobs in areas that are important 
and urgent but have been neglected by the market due to the lack of profit opportunities. I thus 
proposed three categories of JG jobs that I believe would be feasible and beneficial to the Chinese 
economy and society today. They are the Green Corps Jobs, the Cultural Heritage Preservation 
Jobs, and other Public Purpose Jobs. 
Finally, following Foster’s theory of Institutional Adjustment, I argue that a Chinese Green 
JG should be implemented in a gradual and pragmatic manner. This is because a Green JG would 
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be a new public policy that tests the organizational capabilities of China’s local governments as 
well as the coordination capabilities among different levels of governments and ministries in 
China. A gradualist approach thus allows for time for the Chinese governments at all levels to 
develop organize, coordinate, and evaluate their capabilities and experiences that are necessary to 
implementing the program successfully. A gradualist approach also allows the Chinese state to 
experiment, evaluate, and expand the best practices to implement a Green JG before rolling it out 
as a national policy. 
In conclusion, a Chinese Green JG is needed because it addresses the deficiency of China’s 
market economy by hiring the currently unemployed workers to achieve public purposes and, in 
the process, put income into the hands of JG workers to stimulate domestic demand and promote 
economic growth. It begins with creating public sector employment to achieve public purposes 
and ends by stimulating the market economy to promote economic growth. Here is the bottom-
line. I have shown that a fully-fledged Chinese Green JG costs 1.58% of GDP. I have also shown 
that a Chinese government deficit equaling 1.58% of GDP to finance the Green JG is sustainable 
and even functional. The question then becomes how much GDP growth will be stimulated as 
the result of full employment. My estimation is that a fully-employed Chinese economy will yield 
an additional 3.13% to 4.55% of GDP, which would bring China’s 2019 GDP to the 9.23% to 
10.65% range. If the GDP growth ends up being higher, excellent. Even if it is lower than my 
estimation, say, 2% (it is highly unlikely that eliminating China’s 5.2% urban unemployment figure 
only contributes to 2% of GDP growth), it is still well worth having a Green JG that brings 
economic security to the 280 million Chinese peasant workers and military veterans by hiring them 
to build a green (green jobs), confident (cultural preservation jobs), and comfortable (other quality-
of-life enhancing jobs) China. A green and full employed Chinese economy is the best testament 
of a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation contributes to the study of the Chinese economy by elaborating China’s 
alternative economic system, examining the evolution of Chinese environmental policies, and 
proposing a Chinese Green Job Guarantee.  
Delineating China’s political economy post-1949, I challenge the Eurocentric 
interpretation of China’s post-1978 economic reform as an incomplete and ongoing transition. To 
understand the Chinese economy, the question to ask is not whether China today is capitalist or 
socialist, or whether the Chinese government is interfering too much with the market, but rather 
what kind of a market economy could best fulfill the developmental vision set by the Chinese 
state. The Chinese economy has transformed into a distinct type of market economy – “Socialist 
Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics” – that is defined by the dominant, evolving, and 
developmental role of the Chinese state in economic and social processes. The Chinese economic 
system should be viewed as an addition to Hyman Minsky’s “fifty-seven” varieties of capitalism 
(1991), not an anomaly in some ongoing and incomplete transition towards a predetermined end.  
While it is difficult to present the totality of the evolving “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” I hope to have convinced my readers that China’s political economy ushers a 
different yet viable political and economic ideology that challenges the Western free market ideal. 
China’s political economy also suggests that the country is in a solid political and institutional 
position to take advantage of creative public policies such as a Green JG to engineer full 
employment and environmental sustainability. 
I argue in the second essay that in attempting to build an ecological civilization, Chinese 
environmental policies have largely evolved from contradiction to synthesis since 2005. Echoing 
my first essay on China’s alternative political and economic system (which is defined by the 
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dominant, evolving, and developmental role of the Chinese state in economic and social 
processes), I argue that the Chinese state has been and will be shaping China’s environmental 
landscape more responsively and effectively now and into the future. 
Finally, I demonstrate in the third essay that the Chinese state should and can implement 
a Chinese Green JG to coordinate economic growth, full employment, structural adjustments, and 
environmental sustainability. I first demonstrate that a Job Guarantee program is far more 
effective in creating jobs than the conventional macroeconomic policies that indirectly create jobs 
by stimulating economic growth. I then explain why China would especially benefit from a Green 
JG and why China’s time to implement it is ripe. Afterwards, I show that a Chinese Green JG is 
affordable. Increasing China’s fiscal deficit by 1.58% of 2019 GDP would have financed a 
complete Chinese Green JG to eliminate China’s the 24.27 million urban individuals currently 
unemployed and elevate China’s GDP growth rate to the 9.23% and 10.65% range in 2019. 
Combined with the many other benefits of a green and fully employed economy, such as 
economic, social, and political stabilities and environmental sustainability, a Chinese Green JG is 
well worth it. Moreover, since a Green JG entails increased deficit spending, I examine the 
sustainability and functionality of Chinese government deficits (and government deficits in 
general) by constructing and examining sector balances for three representative countries – China, 
the U.S., and Greece. My conclusion is that China’s deficit spending to finance the Green JG is 
not only sustainable but also functional. Finally, I explore the design of a Chinese Green JG, such 
as how it should be administered, what jobs it could create, and why China should adopt a 
gradualist approach in order to implement it. 
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